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ABSTRACT

The basic aim of this thesis is to investigate unemployment in Australia
using a disequilibrium framework. In particular, involuntary unemployment is
examined from both a Keynesian and a Classical perspective. As a consequence,
both Classical and Keynesian doctrines were interpreted as disequilibrium theories
called Neo-Classical and (New) Keynesian respectively. Examined within a (New)
Keynesian (disequilibrium) theory an unambiguous definition of involuntary
unemployment emerges. The Neo-Classical (disequilibrium) theory, unlike the
Classical theory, also allows for bouts of involuntary unemployment.
Consequently, a distinction between Neo-Classical and (New) Keynesian
involuntary unemployment is considered a matter of degree rather than principle; if
wages adjust more rapidly than employment toward equilibrium, then
unemployment would be Neo-Classical.

Furthermore, since involuntary

unemployment is a disequilibrium concept, the unemployment model was
estimated using a disequilibrium procedure. After reviewing the econometrics and
theory of disequilibrium a generalized partial adjustment equation, developed by
Chow (1983), was adopted. This procedure has distinct advantages over other
techniques. The unemployment model was estimated for Australia over two
periods: 1964 to 1972 for the first period and from 1972 to 1986 for the second
period. It was found that neither period could be classified as either pure (New)
Keynesian or Neo-Classical; however, there is evidence of elements of both
theories in each period.

This thesis also examined structural and search

unemployment. Finally, evidence of labour dishoarding in period two was also
found.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
1.1

AUSTRALIA'S UNEMPLOYMENT:
1.1.1

AN OVERVIEW

Extent of Australia's IlneniDlovment

Observation of graph 1.1 indicates that unemployment in Australia has shown an
upward trend since the 1960s, particularly after 1974. Registered unemployment peaked
in 1983 at 10.7 per cent of the workforce (February), and has now settled at around the 8
per cent level. Over this time span two periods are worthy of special attention: 1974
(November) to 1978 (February) during which unemployment rates accelerated from 3.7
per cent to 7.5 per cent respectively and 1981 (February) to 1983 (February) in which
unemployment rates rose from 6.3 per cent to 10.7 per cent.
Since peaking in 1985, the registered unemployment rate has settled at around the
8 per cent level. The labour market, however, has issued some confused signals over the
significance of this level. A rate of 8 per cent, given post-war history, would seem
abnormally high and indicative of depressed demand; however, Sloan (1985) and others
are now speaking of 7 per cent unemployment as the true full employment level.
From an international perspective, Australia's unemployment rates have
deteriorated over this period relative to the average unemployment rates for OECD
countries. Whilst Australia was consistently below the OECD average before 1975, it
has been, in general, consistently near or above the OECD average since 1975. This can
be seen from Graph 1.2.
1.1.2

Dimensions nf Ilnemnlovment

Traditionally as unemployment rises (a downturn in the trade-cycle), persons who
are able to work may become discouraged and stop looking for work. Married women,
for example, may stop searching for a job and stay at home. In other words participation
rates and economic activity are, in general, positively related. Two implications are;
that (i) employment and unemployment are not exact opposites and therefore

GRAPH 1.1
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Table 1.1: Labour Force Linemplovment Rates (a) for
Selected OECD Countries
1972-1986
(Per cent)

USA

Year(b) Australia

6.2
5.6
5.5
4.9
5.3
5.6
6.9
8.3
7.1
7.6
8.0
6.9
8.3
6.0
7.4
5.8
7.4
7.0
7.5
7.5
9.5
10.9
9.5 . 11.8
11.2
7.4
10.4
7.1
9.7
7.0

2.6
2.3
2.7
4.8
4.7
5.6
6.2
6.2
6.0
5.7
7.1
9.9
8.9
8.2
7.9

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

France

Canada Japan

Source: Labour Statistics, AustraUa;

Germany

Sweden

UK

2.7
2.5
2.0
1.6
1.6
1.8
2.2
2.1
2.0
2.5
3.1
3.5
3.1
2.8
2.8

4.2
3.2
3.1
4.3 •
5.7
6.1
6.0
5.1
6.6
9.9
11.4
12.6
13.0
13.2
13.1

3.4
3.2
2.8
5.8
6.6
7.0
7.1
7.6
7.5
8.3
9.0
9.8
10.2
10.5
10.9

0.7
0.7
1.6
3.6
3.7
3.6
3.5
3.2
3.0
4.4
6.1
8.0
8.5
8.6
8.4

2.8
2.7
2.9
4.0
4.4
4.9
5.2
5.9
6.3
7.3
8.1
8.3
9.7
10.1
10.0

1.4
1.3
1.4
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.2
2.1
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.7
2.6
2.6

Italy

1972/74, 1982 p.l34; 1975/85, 1985 p.l42
OECD Main Economic Indicators, 1986. p. 18

Graph 1.2: Comparative Unemplovment Rates
Constructed from above table
Average Annual Unemployment Rate (%)
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one cannot equate an increase in unemployment with a reduction in employment, and (ii)
that the discouraged worker effect reduces the labour supply. Varying participation rates,
independent of economic activity, may provide, in part, an exogeneous explanation of the
variation of the unemployment rate. Unemployment rates may therefore be higher than
official data will suggest.
Gregory (1984) argues that the traditional relationship between economic activity
and the participation rate had not always held in Australia during the seventies. He states:
"during the seventies the rate at which people entered and left the labour force in response
to job opportunities became more volatile.

The large increase in [registered]

unemployment during 1974-75, for example, now seems to be not so much due to the
rate of job loss, that was exceptional for a recession, but to the exceptional behaviour of
the labour force participation rate. When faced with deteriorating job prospects during
1974, workers did not leave the labour force at the same rate as in earlier recessions.
Consequently, [registered] unemployment increased more quickly by a larger amount"
(Gregory 1984, pl3-14). A similar experience occurred in 1979. This phenomenon has
been illustrated in the Gregory and Duncan (1979) thesis, where they compared
withdrawal and entry to the labour force in the 1951 recession with the 1974-75 recession
(Gregory 1984, pl3-14). As well as a change in the level of the participation rate, there
has also been a change in the composition of the participation rate. Table 1.2 highlights
this development.
The proportion of the total labour force comprised of married females has
increased consistently since the 1960s. As Mitchell (1984, p5) points out: "Australia's
labour force exhibits two characteristics found in other English-speaking countries:
declining male participation rates and rising female participation rates".
According to Mangan and Stokes (1984, p40,41), available data suggest that
females and particularly married females dominate the stock of discouraged workers.
Moreover, the discouraged female worker is likely to be aged over 25 years. To be
registered as unemployed, a person

must

be actively

seeking

employment.

TABLE 1.2: Labour Force Participation Rates»

Year at
August

X

Males

All Females

Married Females

Persons

1966

84.0

36.3

29.0

59.9

1973

82.1

41.4

39.0

61.6

1982

76.6

43.9

42.1

60.1

1986

75.9

43.7

43.1

60.1

Absolute
change from
1966-86
-8.1

+7.4

+14.1

+0.2

Defined as the percentage ratio of the labour force to the population aged 15 years and over.

Source: The Labour Force Australia, ABS, Catalogue No. 6203

Discouraged workers are often referred to as hidden unemployment. "At August 1979 a
total of 373,800 persons were registered unemployed, while Strieker and Sheehan (1981)
estimate that a further 353,000 persons were hidden unemployed" (Mangan and Stokes,
1984, p38). More recent figures, according to Mangan and Stokes (1984, p23), indicate
that "close to one million persons or 15 per cent of the total labour force (at May 1982)",
would have been unemployed, if all dimensions of unemployment had been considered.
It can therefore be seen that participation rates exert an influence on the
unemployment rate. The discouraged worker effect, if not considered, may lead to
significant underestimation of unemployment levels. This is indicative of segmentation in
the labour market. Whitfield (1986, pi 19-122), has cited a number of studies which
identify significant areas of segmentation and disadvantaged groups for the Australian
labour market. Moreover, Watkins (1986, pi4-15) cites a number of authors who argue
"that the jobs into which students enter are divided into institutionally and technologically
discrete segments. Such a phenomenon has been noted in Australia by Gilmour and

Landsbury (1978)... On a broader scale, Windschuttle (1979) argues that the trend in
Australia is toward a segmented labour market."

1.1.3

Qf Un^mplQYffi^nt

Since the 1960s three groups exhibited above-average unemployment rates;
females, older males and teenagers. Whilst registered unemployment rates for females
have approached equality with those of males at around 8 per cent in 1987, there is
considerable evidence to suggest that females suffer disproportionately high rates of
hidden unemployment and underemployment. Underemployment is where workers
receive fewer hours than they desire.

It is perhaps to be expected that females,

particularly married females, would feature prominently in hidden unemployment, as
unemployed married females have no monetary incentive to register as unemployed.
Merrilees (1982a) has shown that, of the total number listed in the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (ABS) surveys of discouraged workers, over 75 per cent on average are
females. The occupational distribution of women, resulting from both demand and
supply side factors, with its high incidence of part-time work, makes underemployment
an inevitable problem. Analysis of A.B.S data on involuntary short-time working shows
that teenage females are the group most affected by underemployment (Mangan and
Stokes 1984, p43, 45).
Older males and older persons in general do not have overly high registered
unemployment rates, but there is considerable evidence of hidden unemployment
amongst older males.

Merrilees (1982b) has documented the "exodus from the

workforce" that occurred in the early 1980s amongst older males. Whether this exodus
was caused by the discouraged worker effect, or induced on the supply side by pensions
and other social welfare payments, is in dispute. What is unquestioned however, is that
if all those older males who left the workforce prematurely returned, the registered
unemployment rate for older males would be much higher.
Strieker and Sheehan (1978, pl5) have shown that the teenage rate of registered
unemployment has often been relatively high: "Even as far back as 1954, the rate of

unemployment for teenagers was 1.7 times that of adults". There are a number of
reasons for this connected with both demand and supply aspects. On the supply side,
teenagers, particularly early school leavers, have little formal human capital and little or
no work experience.

In addition, the reduction in employment opportunities in

manufacturing during the 1970's restricted the traditional ports of entry for unskilled
youth. There is also evidence that employees are substituting married females for youth,
which may in part be due to the traditional job search behaviour of youth, and its
consequent effect on labour turnover.

Rice (1986) in her work on juvenile

unemployment in Britain, found that failure to achieve initial entry into the labour market
was a serious problem for young school leavers and one which disadvantaged them in the
long term. Miller and Volker (1987) have also found similar evidence for Australia.

1.2

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT
1.2.1

Social Costs of Unemplovment

An enormous amount of literature exists today on unemployment which contains
various views on causes and policy prescriptions. Often many papers assume its
importance. This section will briefly demonstrate, not assume, that unemployment does
matter and any investigation that may shed light on its causes and cures is worth
pursuing. In both social and economic dimensions unemployment is a problem.
As Tomlinson (1983, p45) points out, the link between unemployment and
poverty was perhaps first subject to rigorous study by Rowntree in England in 1936. He
states: "that 1930's unemployment was the major cause of poverty and was shown in
Rowntree's study of York in 1936 and the New Survey of London in the early 1930's".
According to Smith (1984), unemployment is perhaps the major factor contributing to the
numbers placed in poverty. There are further social ramifications of unemployment on
the physical and mental health of those unemployed.
Smith (1984, pl25), citing a 1975 study by the Victorian Mental Health
Authority, "showed that the rate of attempted suicide among the unemployed (in Ballarat)

was more than twelve times the average area rate". In the Blacktown area of New South
Wales the salient feature of those attempting suicide was unemployment. A recent paper
presented to the University of Wollongong by Ahlburg (1984) reflects similar findings.
Ahlburg (1984, plO), citing a study by Martina (1984) of the Australian National
University, reported a "positive association between unemployment and suicide rates for
males 15-29 years with males 20-24 most sensitive to unemployment [and]....found a
positive correlation between the unemployment rate and the percentage of male deaths
attributable to suicide for the period 1966-1980 (significant at the .05 level)". Ahlburg
(1984, p3) further cites a study conducted in conjuction with Schapiro (1982-83); they
"found that a one per cent increase in the United States unemployment rate in 1980 led to
an additional 320 suicides". It has been assumed thus far that despair is a consequence of
being unemployed for long periods. Viney (1984) in her article 'The Psychological and
Social Effects of Unemployment', however, cites numerous studies linking many
adverse psychological states with unemployment.

Many of these studies linked

unemployment with various states of anxiety, such as shame, guilt, loneliness,
helplessness and depression; as Viney (1984, pi35) states, the "most important of all,
and that which many underlie all these other [states], is alienation."
In respect to physical health Smith (1984) states that "the deterioration of diet
(through poverty) combined with general depression means that some unemployed and
their children are particularly prone to illness. A study undertaken in Birmingham
indicated that parental unemployment doubled the risk of a child's admission to hospital
(generally with an infectious disease). Brunn and Drane at Macquarie University also
showed a strong association between ischaemic heart disease, mortality and
unemployment" (Smith, 1984, pl25).
The reader should, however, be aware of the tenuous statistical links between
unemployment, health and poverty. Both Tomlinson (1983) and Ahlburg (1984) address
the writings of Ian Stem. Tomlinson (1983, p36), in citing Stem (1981), writes: "the
inter-relationship between the incidence of poverty, unemployment, low eamings, high
mortality and high morbidity rates makes it very difficult to disentangle the effect of

unemployment from the effects of other variables on morbidity and mortality rates."
Ahlburg (1984, p3) also writes: "Stem (1983) has recently argued 'that there is no
reliable evidence, as yet, in favour of the view that unemployment is the major
determinant of morbidity and/or mortality', since it is not possible to establish the
direction of causality. In fact [Stem (1983)] argues that the incidence of ill-health and
unemployment are both strongly affected by [other] underlying socio-economic factors."
As demonstrated in the previous section, however, unemployment does not fall
proportionately on those in the labour market. Those who are in disadvantaged or weak
positions in the labour market are more prone to be unemployed. Thus, as Tomlinson
(1983, p36) points out, unemployment "may serve to reinforce as much as cause a
pattem of low income" and ill-health.
Another problem of being unemployed is, as Tomlinson (1983) argues, the depoliticisation of those persons out of work, as it deprives them of the resources, such as
unions, income and knowledge, which are a necessary pre-condition for political activity.
The de-politicisation, coupled with the alienation of the unemployed, may damage social
and political order. Dwyer and Wilson (1981) "found evidence of increased social
tension among the unemployed inner city youth" (in Ahlburg, 1984, plO). Tomlinson
(1983) cites Hitler's rise to power in Germany when the level of mass unemployment
(30%) was on a scale never experienced by Britain. Tomlinson (1983) points out,
however, quite rightly, that Hitler's rise to power was due to many other important
factors. This paper does not wish to overstate the social and political dissent caused by
unemployment, but merely wishes to make the point that perhaps other subtle social
changes are underfoot.
Indeed the increase in crime associated with increased unemployment is a
manifestation of anti-social behaviour. Ahlburg (1984, plO), citing the Yearbook of
Australia (1983), found that a parallel rise in crime occurred over the period 1971-72 to
1980-81, "even though the prime crime group (males 15-24 years) remained relatively
constant at about 9 per cent of the population over this period." Smith (1984, pi26)
states that "perhaps one of the most significant research studies was that done by the

South Australian Working Party into Unemployment (May, 1976) which showed the
percentage increase for several classes of offenders in the period June 1973-76".
TABLE 1.3 Percentage Increase in Crime by Class
Age 14 to 18
Total offenders
School-attending offenders
Workforce employed offenders
Workforce unemployed offenders

Increase
58%
40% (approx.)
37%
238%

Source: Smith, P. (1984, pl26).

Heeding Stem's point about causality, this paper does not wish to overstate the
causation between unemployment and criminalization. Indeed, increasing crime could
well be inherent in the youth of Western cultures and as such may be the third variable
correlating rising crime and unemployment; however, if crime among unemployed youth
is rising faster than non-unemployed youth, then unemployment is at least a reinforcing
factor in therisingcrime rate. The study by the South Australian Working Party seems to
bear this out. The increase in crime for unemployed offenders was significantly greater
than that for non-unemployed offenders (school attenders and employed offenders).
The conclusion is that the goal of reducing unemployment is socially desirable.
Reduced unemployment is not a panacea, but certainly the attainment of full employment
facilitates an improvement in the effectiveness of many socially desirable welfare
objectives. For example, the tasks of anti-discrimination Boards would be more effective
during a period of full employment because periods of high unemployment allow
employers more easily to rationalize discrimination in employment policies. Also, a
reduction in unemployment benefits (not necessarily the rate per person) and an increase

in tax revenue not only removes an economic constraint on growth, but also releases
more funds to finance both economic and social schemes. The opportunity costs of
unemployment would also appear to be significant.

1.2.2

The Economic Costs of Unemplovment

Studies in the United Kingdom (1981) of the economic costs of unemployment
have shown a major impact on the United Kingdom's budget. Most careful estimates,
according to Tomlinson (1983, p387), suggest "that the budgetary impact of 2.88 million
unemployed was approximately £13 billion. As an indication of the magnitudes of lost
output, the Manpower Services Commission estimated that starting from a base level of
700,0(X) [unemployed], each 1(X),(X)0 extra unemployed people cost £590 million of
output forgone. Thus, the loss to the national economy of 3 million unemployed would
be of the order of £13.6 billion of output."
Estimates of forgone output for Australia have been conducted by Kalisch (1982)
and Gruen and Chapman (1984), who revised Kalisch's investigation. They both found
significant output losses due to unemployment. Potential Output (PO), from which
foregone output is calculated, was derived by the formulae:
PO = GDP [1 + b(U - F)]

(1)

where GDP denotes gross domestic product, u is the unemployment rate and b is Okun's
Law coefficient:
"In 1962 Okun argued that a decrease of one percentage point in the
unemployment rate in the United States would lead to an increase in G.N .P. of 3.2 per
cent" (Kalisch 1982, pi). This observed relationship between employment and output
became known as Okun's Law. Using a time-series econometric approach, Kalisch
(1982, plO) estimated Okun's Law coefficient (b) for Australia to be 2.748; a reduction
of one percentage point in unemployment would yield a gain in output of 2.748 per cent.
The full employment rate is denoted by F with the residual unemployment
described as the natural rate of unemployment (NRU). The NRU is the residual
unemployment that exists when the labour market is in equilibrium (i.e. labour demand

and labour supply intersect). The residual unemployment is those persons currently
moving between jobs. They are frictionally unemployed and are traditionally considered
to be voluntarily unemployed. Structural unemployment, a mismatch in labour skills
supplied and demanded, is often thought of as part of the NRU.
Presented below is a table of forgone output for Australia during the eighties, for
various arbitrarily-chosen levels of F(NRU). In the construction of this table Kalisch's
(1982) estimate of the Okun's Law coefficient was retained and applied to recent ABS
data. Both forgone and potential output are presented in Table 1.4. Output losses are
significant at each level of NRU. Even when the NRU is assumed to be 6.0 per cent the
total loss in GDP (average 1979/80 prices) for the period 1980-86 (at June) is
approximately $9,253 million. Interestingly when the NRU is 6.0 per cent, potential and
actual GDP in 1980 virtually coincide, while in 1981 the economy's output exceeded its
potential level.
Smith (1984, pl20) also states that "with an average rate of unemployment of
450,000 persons [the level for Australia in 1982] we can expect to lose about $900
million in tax revenue, and another $1200 million or so in unemployment benefits."
Finally, the long term ramifications of persistently high levels of unemployment, while in
part being a manifestation of poor structural change, may in turn, tend to make the
economy less receptive to changes in consumption and production techniques. For
example, it becomes increasingly difficult for firms in a climate of persistent high levels
of unemployment, to adopt labour-saving capital perhaps due to union pressure.
It has been demonstrated that a persistendy high level of unemployment is both
socially and economically undesirable in terms of costs to the individual and society.
Unemployment does matter and its reduction is a fruitful policy to pursue. If the
designers of policy do not consider the social costs of unemployment, then the potential
benefits of a policy designed to reduce unemployment will be underestimated.

TABLE 1.4 Forgone Output for Australia af Tune 1980-1986
(GDP $mill. at 1979/80 average prices)

Natural Rate of Unemployment (NRU)

GDP
$mill

6.0

2.0

4.0

GDP
PO
Forgone Output

28636
31862
3226

30288
1653

28715
79

GDP
PO
Forgone Output

29880
32508
2628

30865
985

29223
(-)657

GDP
PO
Forgone Output

30079
33881
3802

32228
2149

30575
496

GDP
PO
Forgone Output

29607
36116
6509

34489
4882

32861
3254

GDP
PO
Forgone Output

32036
38110
6074

36350
4314

34589
2553

1985

GDP
PO
Forgone Output

33659
39486
5827

37636
3977

35786
2127

1986

GDP
PO
Forgone Ou^ut

33979
39115
5136

37247
3268

35380
1401

Total Forgone
Output: $mill.

33202

21228

9253

June

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

June '80
to
June '86

(%)

U(June)

6.1

5.2

6.6

10.0

8.9

8.3

7.5

b = 2.748

Constructed from data in:
1980-84, A.B.S. Time Series Data, Cat. No. 1311
1985-86(2) A.B.S. Ubour Force Australia, Cat. No. 6202
and National Income and Expenditure Cat. No. 5206.

1.3

ORTFrTTVES: AN OVERVIEW
The aim of this study is to disaggregate registered unemployed into its various
types according to the causes of unemployment. Unemployment may arise due to
insufficient output, excessive real wages, structural and search factors. Isolating the
causes of unemployment is directly relevant to policy formulation. The paper adopts a
non-tâtonnement (i.e. without-auctioneer) approach.
Economic theory can be dichotomized into two broad levels as depicted below.
Equilibrium theory traditionally revolves around the Walrasian auctioneer where
exchange in the market place (trade) occurs only when the market-clearing (equilibrium)
prices are determined by an overseer. This analysis is most appropriate in markets such
as the stock exchange, where trade occurs when supply and demand curves intersect.
Underlying non-tâtonnement theory is the premise that an overseer or Walrasian
auctioneer does not exist
DIAGRAM 1.1
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Consequently, trade may occur in disequilibrium, where supply and demand
curves do not intersect; trade may occur at above or below equilibrium prices. In the
Walrasian market no trade occurs until equilibrium prices are found. The time that
elapses during the tâtonnement process is not real economic time. A modem version of
the Wakasian system is the re-contracting process, where contracts are agreed upon if
prices are equilibrium prices; if they are not, then traders re-contract after renegotiating.
The point is that without an auctioneer, prices do not instantaneously adjust to market

disequilibrium. In other words, in the non-tâtonnement process, as Keynes highlights,
quantities are a significant source of adjustment.
Underlying the principle that trade occurs in disequilibrium is the concept of
dynamics. Disequilibrium implies dynamics, but as Hey (1981) points out, this implies
non-optimal behaviour. As a result, models where disequilibrium prices are assumed to
be fixed have evolved in the literature of disequilibrium. Although they are static
disequilibrium models, they are described as being in a steady-state and hence in
equilibrium (SSE). It will be demonstrated that the assumption of non-tâtonnement in
the labour market and the ensuing theory is an appropriate framework for the study of
unemployment.
The non-tâtonnement approach stems from the proposition that at least part of
registered unemployment is a disequilibrium phenomenon. In other words, there are
persons who are involuntarily unemployed; regardless of wage movements, labour may
not be able to find work due to insufficient vacancies. This is an elusive concept, but it
will be demonstrated that the elusive nature of this term can be overcome within a
disequilibrium model. Consequendy, the specification and estimation procedure adopted
by this paper will reflect the disequilibrium nature of the labour market.
Given that non-tâtonnement trade underlies unemployment, then an estimation
procedure which assumes that markets clear is logically inconsistent. This thesis
discusses various non-tâtonnement estimation procedures. Since the thesis is attempting
to disaggregate unemployment in the long run, it is supposed that wages are flexible and
therefore endogenous. Thus a dynamic disequilibrium approach as opposed to a static
disequilibrium approach is adopted. The problem of non-optimal behaviour is addressed
within the dynamic estimation procedure adopted. Finally, non-tâtonnement economics
has evolved out of a reappraisal of Keynes; the thrust of Keynesian economics is that
quantities adjust faster than prices (as exemplified by the often-repeated assumption of
fixed money wages in the short run).
The disequilibrium approach also overcomes an inconsistency of the Neoclassical theory; that is, Neo-Classical interpretations propose that unemployment may

emanate from excessive (disequilibrium) real wages within a Walrasian framework.
Therefore Neo-Classical theory (contrary to Classical) supposes a degree of
disequilibrium. Consequently, both Keynesian and Neo-Classical doctrines can be
captured by non-tâtonnement economics. This framework provides a simple dichotomy
of unemployment into Keynesian and Neo-Classical. If prices react significantly faster
than quantities, then the Neo-Classical analysis would be the prédominent explanation of
unemployment.

If quantities react faster than prices, then a Keynesian scenario

dominates. This exposition of the two theories is crucial when one wants to distinguish
their effects within a dynamic framework.
It will also be demonstrated that there is almost no objective criterion clearly to
distinguish between Keynesian and Neo-Classical theories of the labour market within a
static (equilibrium) framework. The existence of a real wage overhang, for example, is
not a sufficient criterion to distinguish between Keynesian and Neo-Classical
unemployment. As a practical matter this point is highlighted by inspection of Table 1.5,
which probably indicates that the steady rise in unemployment since 1973 is primarily the
result of excessive real wages. "An index of unit labour cost - of how much must be
spent on labour to produce a unit of output - [captures] ... real wage changes plus
supplementary cost changes less productivity movements", (Hanratty and Vipond, 1982,
pi99). Rising real unit labour costs may not necessarily be the result of rising real
wages. Hanratty and Vipond (1982, pl99) state, however, that the main component of
the rise in the real unit labour cost for the period 1973-75 was real wage movements. In
the period 1966 to 1973 real unit labour costs remained constant, but rose by 0.7 per cent
over the period 1973 to 1982 and by 0.4 per cent over the whole period 1966 to 1982.
This undoubtedly indicates an excessive rise in labour costs; 9.7 per cent for the early
period, 15.1 per cent during 1973-82 and an increase of 12.7 per cent over the whole
period (1966-82). Labour productivity during 1973-82, however, increased at half the
rate than for the period 1966-73, perhaps indicating that there was a dramatic decline in
output for the period 1973-82. A decline in output, assuming downward rigidity of
money wages, may result in excessive real wages due to a leftward shift of the marginal

revenue product of labour function: the result could be described as a real wage
overhang. In a Neo-Classical scenario a real wage overhang may result from an
exogenous wage push, whereas a Keynesian may explain a real wages overhang in terms
of a leftward shift in the marginal revenue product of labour schedule; or if real wages are
specified on the vertical axis of a labour market diagram, a decline in output may be
captured as a movement up the labour demand function. Consequently, the observed
phenomenon of a real wage overhang can be explained by both scenarios. Therefore, the
existence of an overhang does not distinguish between the two doctrines. A measure of
the relative speeds of adjustment of wages and employment toward equilibrium on the
other hand, will hopefully provide a criterion for distinguishing between Keynesian and
Neo-Classical theories. To capture a Keynesian scenario (an exogenous change in
output) on a labour market diagram is difficult; presumably a change in output will
manifest itself via a change in price. This difficulty is avoided by Patinkin (1956,1965)
whose arguments are developed in the following sections.
TABLE 1.5
Nonfarm Productivity and Related Trends
Sentemher 1966-Sentember 1982
Sept 1966
- Sept 1973
Productivity^
Labour costs^
Unit labour costs^
Real labour costs^
Real unit labour costs®
Price inflation^
a
b
c
^
®
f
Source:

3.6%
9.7
5.9
3.6
0.0
5.9

Sept 1973
- Sept 1982

Sept 1966
- Sept 1982

1.9%
15.1
12.9
2.8
0.7
12.0

2.7%
12.7
9.8
3.1
0.4
9.3

Gross nonfarm output at 1979-80 prices per hour worked by nonfarm employees,
Nonfarm labour compensation (wages, salaries, supplements, payroll taxes) per hour worked,
Labour costs divided by productivity.
Labour costs divided by implicit price deflator for gross nonfarm product
Unit labour costs divided by implicit price deflator for gross nonfarm product
Implicit price deflator for gross nonfarm product
Mitchell D J.B. (1984), The Australian Labour Market. Centre for Economic Policy Research,
Discussion Paper No. Bl, p.24.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1

NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMTCS
At a broad level two variants of unemployment theory exist. One is the Lucas and

Rapping (1969) model, which explains short-run variation in employment within an
equilibrium framework. Consequently, all unemployment is voluntary. The other
interpretation permits degrees of disequilibrium and therefore involuntary unemployment.
It will be shown in this section that a disequilibrium approach to Neo-Classical
unemployment is appropriate, thus allowing for a clear distinction to be drawn between
Classical and Neo-Classical labour markets.
According to Shapiro (1974), the Classical theory evolved from the writings of
Ricardo, Mill, Say and Marshall, long before the appearance of Keynes' 'General
Theory', in 1936. "The Walrasian [Neo-Classical] system does not allow for market
imperfections in the form of unions, minimum wage law, etc., and Say's Law does not
allow for excess supply in markets" (Hughes and Perlman, 1984, p54). Say's Law is
commonly stated as: the supply of goods and services creates its own demand. The
implication is that there is no over-production. According to Harris (1981, p92), Say's
Law asserts "that real national income is always at the full-employment level, since the
corresponding supply of goods is always matched by demand". Say's Law, it is argued,
is still valid when it is acknowledged that savings decreases consumption. In the
Classical scheme, interest rates will decline which would stimulate investment to offset
the decline in consumption. Aggregate demand cannot be deficient since savings and
investment are synchronized by interest rates. Harris (1981), however, argues that there
is a distinction between Say's Identity and Say's Law; the precise meaning or
interpretation of Say is controversial. Say's Identity, where supply equals demand in the
market when trade occurs, does not necessarily rule out the possibility of overproduction. "As Sowell (1974) demonstrates, even Say himself admitted the possibility

of general gluts" (Harris, 1981, p97). The Neo-Classical theory, like the Classical
theory, utilizes Say's and Wakas' law. Neo-Classical theory however, relies more on
the writings of Pigou: the Theory of Unemployment (1933) and Lapses from Full
Employment (1944). Pigou in his writings acknowledges the imperfect nature of
markets, in particular labour markets, and therefore unlike the Classical theory allows for
bouts of involuntary unemployment. A number of institutional factors, such as unions,
heterogeneous labour, segmented labour markets, and the immobility of labour between
markets were, according to Solow (1980), addressed by Pigou in his writings:^
"Pigou's remarks in the middle of the great depression, to the Macmillan Committee,
when asked to explain why unemployment was so high, were... that the relative demand
for labour in different occupations had altered, and the transfers of labour appropriate to
those alterations have not taken place" (Lekachman, 1969, p50-51).
Solow (1980, p4) further argues that, in Pigou's 1933 paper, he made reference
to minimum wages: "He [Pigou] wrote 'public opinion...builds up for itself a rough
estimate of what constitutes a reasonable living wage. This is derived half-consciously
from a knowledge of the actual standards enjoyed by more or less average workers'...
Such feelings about equity and fairness are obviously relevant to setting statutory
minimum wages, and Pigou uses them in that way". Interestingly, in 1907 in Australia,
"Mr Justice Higgins was obliged to rule on what was a fair and reasonable wage rate
sufficient to meet the needs of an average family man" (Veale et.al., 1983, pl44). This
resembles present day arguments that unemployment is Neo-Classical in the sense that
economic and social institutions prevent the clearing of labour markets. Knowledge of
"average workers' standards" implies wage comparisons and perhaps margins. Another
factor mentioned by Pigou is the provision of unemployment insurance (Solow, 1980,
p5). A strong inference is that wages need not adjust instantaneously to market forces in
a Neo-Classical framework. Neo-Classical theory, as distinct from the Classical theory,
permits a greater degree of disequilibrium.
See Solow (1980) for a detailed discussion.

Both the Neo-Classical and Classical labour demand functions are based on two
overlapping hypotheses. Firstly, firms are perfectly competitive in supplying their
products and hiring labour, and they maximize profits. The second hypothesis, which is
a corollary of the first, is that employed labour exhibits diminishing marginal returns.
According to the first proposition, firms will be in equilibrium when the marginal product
of labour is equal to the market real wage. The second hypothesis dictates that firms are
induced to hire additional labour when real wages decline; this inverse relationship is
depicted by L d in Diagram 2.1. Labour supply too is a function of the real wage,
reflecting the choice between employment and leisure. The higher the real wage, the
higher is the opportunity cost of leisure. When supply equals demand, equilibrium in the
labour market is achieved. There is no involuntary unemployment; all those desiring
employment are in fact working. This long run position, depicted by point E, is a
characteristic of both the Classical and Neo-Classical theory, where in the long-run only
frictional unemployment exists. In contrast to the Classical theory, the Neo-Classical
doctrine explains short-run variation in (involuntary) unemployment (at Wi in diagram
2.1). Indeed, according to Hughes and Perlman (1984, p55), "adjustment takes time how long depending on how fast workers react to their predicament (i.e. disequilibrium)
by adjusting their wages to put themselves back on their supply curve. There is nothing
in Walrasian analysis to tell just how long this 'groping' toward equilibrium takes place,
but it occurs rapidly enough so that there is no room in the analysis for a 'great
depression'... [Adjustment is primarily via flexible wage (price) movements]... The
theory would even admit to some small amount of long-run [involuntary] unemployment
if workers refuse to lower their real wage because of institutional factors". This echoes
the thoughts of Pigou.
The search theory of unemployment is

distinguished from frictional

unemployment in that real wages are assumed to be too high to clear the labour market.
Briefly, it has been postulated that over the years, people have steadily been searching
longer for employment due to changes in social and economic institutions.
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Rising unemployment benefits have been singled out as a significant factor in explaining
an increase in search unemployment. The advent of these benefits has lowered the
opportunity cost of being unemployed; higher real wages are therefore necessary to attract
labour into employment. Wachtel (1984, p267), states more formally that "the
unemployed are said to have a reservation [wage] because their ability to acquire income
through unemployment compensation deters them from taking certain jobs. A reservation
wage is the wage rate that will induce an individual to forsake unemployment". Search
theory assumes that efficient search activity occurs only when one is not working.
While this version of the Neo-Classical doctrine explains short-run variations in
unemployment, the Classical theory does not. Both the Classical and Neo-Classical
theories are general models and are embedded in Walras' Law. The salient features of
Walras' Law are:
i)
equilibrium is achieved instantaneously by price adjustment; and
ii) trade in the market place does not occur out of equilibrium.
The only steady-states are Walrasian equilibria, with market-clearing equilibrium prices.
"Walras' law implies that all prices cannot change in the same direction and that relative
prices must change." (Varian, 1975, p218). The equality or intersection of supply and
demand is first achieved and then trade or exchange occurs between buyers and sellers.
With respect to the labour market, exchange will only occur at point E in diagram 2.1; by
definition involuntary unemployment does not occur. Yet Neo-Classical theory as voiced
by Pigou, acknowledges the imperfect nature of labour markets and therefore allows for
bouts of involuntary [disequilibrium] unemployment.^ The Neo-Classical theory as
distinct from the Classical model, may explain short-run involuntary unemployment; it is
however, inconsistent with Say's Law and Walras' Law and therefore constitutes a
theoretical break from Wakas' general framework. The Lucas and Rapping (1969)
2
It may be pointed out that when labour supply and labour demand functions intersect, the
existence of frictional (voluntary) unemployment implies non-t^tonnement; equilibrium prices may not
clear the market. The fact that labour is searching suggests that the Wahasian auctioneer is not
overseeing the market and providing complete information about wage rates and employment
opportunities.

mcxiel overcomes this inconsistency by explaining short-run variation in unemployment
within an equilibrium framework where all trade occurs at equilibrium positions.
As asserted by them, the Lucas and Rapping (1969) model (estimated for the
period 1930-65) is Keynesian, but according to Rees (1970, p306) it appears to be "more
Classical than Keynesian". The model describes a labour market that is in continuous
short-run equilibrium (i.e. where labour supply equals labour demand). Those persons
who want jobs have them; unemployment is therefore voluntary. The model is depicted
graphically in diagram 2.2. Briefly, the economy is in long-run equilibrium at EQ where
long-run full employment (L^e) is given by the long-run supply of labour curve (L^e).
Suppose that the short-run full employment level is now L^e. The reduction in
employment (measured as L^e - L^e) is purely voluntary. Rees (1970, p306) states:
"the short-run supply is always equal to employment. Measured unemployment, though
it is a component of the long-run labour supply [Le^], is not a part of the short-run
supply [SL^s]. This is equivalent to assuming that measured unemployment is
voluntary....Since Lucas and Rapping do not regard measured unemployment as part of
the short-run supply of labour, how do they regard it? In their own words, it is viewed
'not as an effective market supply, part of which cannot find employment, but rather as
the supply of labour which would be forthcoming at perceived nominal wages and
prices.' Measured unemployment (more exactly its non-frictional component) is then
viewed as consisting of persons who regard the wage rates at which they could currently
be employed as temporarily too low, and who therefore choose to wait or search for
improved conditions rather than to invest in moving or occupational choice."
The authorities could attempt to artificially move the economy back to EQ. The
result would be reduced unemployment at the expense of price inflation; this resembles
the trade-off embodied in a stable short-run Phillips curve (where price is on the vertical
axis), although the original Phillips curve used the rate of change of money wages instead
of prices. Alternatively, the authorities could allow the economy to adjust to its long-run
position (at E2). The voluntarily unemployed revise their wage expectations downwards
and accept a lower wage.
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Rees (1970, p308) criticizes Lucas' and Rapping's (1969) model on two fronts.
He argues that "when all markets are depressed in varying degree, a few of the
unemployed might still be able to find work by shifting their location or trade, but it is
surely not true that all of them could do so at once". Rees (1970, p308) further points
out that most Keynesians would argue that, even with flexible wages, aggregate demand
would be reduced further if all workers reduce their wage. Patinkin's (1956, 1965)
labour market model, developed later in this paper, shows that a general decline in real
wages may not increase employment. The second misgiving concerns the model's
inability to explain the long bouts of mass unemployment that occurred in the "ten years
of depression in the U.S. and even longer in the U.K" (Hughes and Perlman, 1984,
p55). In the Lucas and Rapping (1969) model the voluntarily unemployed hold out for
jobs because the wage is 'temporarily' too low; however, as Rees (1970, p308)
remarks, "it is hard to imagine the long-term unemployed holding out for jobs,
comparable with their old jobs, at their old real compensation, over periods of up to ten
years". Not all unemployment during the Great Depression was voluntary.
A final misgiving is that the Lucas and Rapping (1969) model, like Friedman's
'inflation-unemployment model', incorrectly predicts that the rate at which people quit
jobs falls during a boom and rises during a recession. This is reflected by the proposition
that the stable short-run traditional Phillips Curve is implied by the Lucas and Rapping
(1969) model. Both theories also ignore the reality that most people do not voluntarily
quit their jobs, in order to search for another job. Indeed, during a period of declining or
slowly growing real wages, often the consequence of a recession (since wages and
economic activity may be procyclical), workers will be less inclined to quit their current
employment. Search activity tends to rise during a boom (when unemployment is low)
and decline during a recession (i.e. high unemployment).
It has been demonstrated that the Lucas and Rapping (1969) model, while
explaining short-run variation in unemployment within an equilibrium framework, has
some theoretical problems. In particular it does not acknowledge involuntary
unemployment, principally because involuntary unemployment can only be addressed in

a disequilibrium framework. The proposition that unemployment is a manifestation of
non-tâtonnement can be drawn from Pigou's writings. However, the inconsistency of
the Neo-Classical model still exists; i.e. disequilibrium trade within a Walrasian
framework. A modification of Walras' Law, or a theory of disequilibrium where the
market is not regulated by an auctioneer, is developed in the next section. Indeed, as
Cherry (1981) points out, Keynesians argue that labour markets do not operate as auction
markets. If trade does not occur at equilibrium prices, where does it occur?

2.2 NON-TATONNEMENT TI^APE IN THE MAFKF;T PLACE

The short-side (clearing or trade) rule will determine what transaction, or quantity
of trade, takes place in the market when prices are not equilibrium ones.
Three axioms of trading out of equilibrium exist in the literature. They are:
i)
rationed sellers and rationed buyers cannot exist in the same market. Households
are sellers of labour time and buyers of goods in the product market. Firms on
the other hand, are buyers of labour time and sellers of goods. When a market is
characterized by excess supply (D<S) then sellers are rationed (quantityconstrained). When excess demand (D>S) occurs in the market buyers become
rationed; excess supply and excess demand in the same market cannot occur
simultaneously;
ii) efficiency: neither side would benefit from any extra trade; and
iii) exchange in the market place (trade) is voluntary;^.
These axioms ensure that the actual quantity transacted is the lesser of the amount
demanded or supplied, depending on the state of the market. If the disequilibrium state
of the market generated excess supply (i.e. actual price above equilibrium price) then the
3
Voluntary trade posits a crucial proposition in welfare economics, that is, voluntary trade is
mutually beneficial to both transacting agents (objective or utility functions are maximized). Trade that
occurs in equilibrium positions leads to Pareto-optimal outcomes. However, when acuial trade occurs at
Uie lesser of supply and demand (i.e. actual price equilibrium price), this leads to non-Pareto-optimal
outcomes, because ofreducedvolumes of exchange (trade) intiiemarket. That is, actu^ trade is less Uian
desired or equilibrium trade. Behaviour, however, is still optimal to Uie extent that individuals maximize
their objective functions given alltiieseconstraints, including quantity constraints.

actual quantity sold would be equal to the amount demanded. Sellers will be quantityconstrained. "The quantity traded in the market is determined by the quantity people wish
to buy at this high price rather than the larger quantity producers wish to sell" (Bowden,
1978a, plO). If the disequilibrium market generated excess demand (a price below the
equilibrium price), then the amount actually sold would be equal to the amount which
sellers wish to supply. Buyers are therefore quantity-constrained. "The basic idea
behind [the short-side rule] is that consumers cannot be sold more than what they want,
and that not more can be sold than is produced." (Bowden, 1978a, plO).
Sinclair (1987, p66) elaborates: "When a market fails to clear, either buyers or
sellers will be unable to trade in the quantities they would like to at the going
[disequilibrium] prices. When the quantity demanded falls short of the quantity offered
for sale, there is excess supply. This characterizes a buyer's market: buyers have no
trouble in purchasing what they want to buy. Sellers will be eager to seek them out. The
opposite occurs when demand outstrips supply. Here we encounter a seller's market;
buyers cannot buy all they wish, while sellers can afford to be choosey. The essential
idea governing the actual volume of trade in such circumstances is the short-side
principle. This stipulates that the effective quantity transacted will be whichever is lower
of demand and supply. It in turn suggests that one side of the market will be [nonpriced] rationed in the quantity of trade they can undertake".
Casson (1981, p41-2) succinctly explains: "because transactions are voluntary,
the quantity traded cannot exceed either the amount demand [D] or supplied [S]. And
because traders will not forgo opportunities for mutually beneficial transactions, the
quantity traded [Q] will never be less than the minimum of the demand and supply. The
actual quantity traded [Q] must therefore be equal to the minimum of demand and
supply." Consequently, trade occurs on what is called the short-side of the market (i.e.
either demand is short and D<S, or supply is short annd D>S). The rule is stated below:
Q

= Min(D,S)

An example of trading on the short-side in reference to the labour market is
provided by point A in diagram 2.1. Here the labour market is characterized by excess

labour supply; labour is rationed (quantity-constrained) in selling some of its labour time.
The actual amount of labour traded, in this example, is the amount of labour demanded
by firms. Point D indicates that the quantity (of labour) that is traded in the market place
is the quantity (of labour) supplied. Assuming that the gap AB describes involuntary
unemployment, the relevance of disequilibrium theory becomes apparent. Point B is an
example of the long-side of the market.
In contrast, within the Walrasian general equilibrium theory, individuals are able
to buy and sell as much of a commodity (be it labour or consumption goods) as they
want; they are not quantity-constrained. Hence, optimum trade in consumption or
employment is decided upon by economic agents given other constraints; mainly, given
prices and endowment of income (i.e. budget constraints). Thus, a modification of the
Walrasian system is that firms and consumers are constrained not only by endowments
and given prices, but also by quantities. Consequentiy, trade other than at equilibrium
can occur on the short-side of the market along the locus LD, E, LS in diagram 2.1.
Point E depicts market-clearing equilibrium prices. The remaining points along LD and
Ls depict non-clearing disequilibrium prices; disequilibrium trade occurs on the shortside of the market. Equipped with this basic theory of disequilibrium trade, the Neoclassical theory is able to explain short-run bouts of involuntary unemployment: real
wages may not adjust instantaneously, due to institutional rigidities and poor information
flows, while prices still react significantly faster than quantity.
A number of choice-theoretic disequilibrium models, which are not without
theoretical problems, have evolved in the literature or disequilibrium, such as Muellbauer
and Portes (1978) and its descendant work by Honkapohja and Ito (1985). A choicetheoretic framework preserves the traditional assumptions of economic agents as rational
optimizing individuals. These models are based on maximizing objective functions (i.e.
profit and utility functions); that is, objective functions are maximized given the usual
Wab-asian constraints plus a quantity constraint which is a manifestation of the short-side
rule which they employ. The models assume fixed prices (wages). This may be
inappropriate since, as Bowden (1978a) points out, tiie information requirements of the

short-side rule implies paradoxically that markets may not persist in a state of
disequilibrium. Strictly, the short-side rule implies that in equilibrium all that is offered is
sold. "This implies that all buyers must have the facility of making successful contact
with sellers in the period considered. Similar remarks hold for other [disequilibrium]
prices" (Bowden, 1978a, pi 1). If the market is characterized by excess demand

(W

< W®) and trade occurs on the short-side of the market, then "all sellers are successfully
sought out by buyers" (Bowden, 1978a, pll). When excess supply exists (W > W®),
"all buyers are successfully located by sellers" (Bowden, 1978a, pll). Informational
flows are not impeded; disequilibrium therefore may not persist. Consequently, the
short-side rule has normally been applied to administered or fixed-price disequilibrium
models. The frequent practice of appending a price-adjustment equation to a market
model for econometric purposes in conjunction with the short-side rule of the form,
Pt-PM = f(D-S)

(2)

is therefore inconsistent. Hey (1981, p20) further remarks that "at an aggregate level,
optimizing and equilibrium necessarily go hand-in-hand or... optimizing and [dynamic]
disequilibrium are incompatible. [Dynamic] disequilibrium implies that some decisionmaker has been frustrated in his plans, but if someone is frustrated, then optimizing has
not been achieved." Furthermore, Rosen and Quandt (1978, p374) point out that the
price-adjustment equation also "lacks a choice-theoretic foundation". Moreover,
according to Honkapohja and Ito (1985), there appears to be no satisfactory theory
explaining why price (wages) should be rigidly fixed in the short-run. Benessy's
(1976), Hahn's (1978) and Nigishi's (1979) conjectural equilibria analysis (cited in
Honkapohja and Ito (1985)), however, attempts to provide a model to explain short-run
price and wage rigidity. Briefly, the theory is analogous to oligopoly price theory, where
if a labourer conjectures that other workers will follow his lower wage offer, then that
person's employability is unchanged. Fixed-price disequilibrium models are equilibrium
models, (i.e. SSE), even though disequilibrium unemployment is being studied. Since
prices in these models are not flexible they do not perform their function of rationing
among different consumers over time.

As a result, these models make explicit non-price rationing schemes. Briefly,
economic agents who face not only the usual Walrasian constraints but also quantity
constraints (in that they may not be able to buy or sell as much of a good as they desire)
will be rationed. Stochastic rationing occurs where rationed agents may be either totally
satisfied or totally dissatisfied. Altematively, a deterministic rationing device means that
all rationed agents are partly satisfied. Agents may be allocated output in proportion to
their stated demand or allocated equal amounts (a uniform scheme). A proportional
scheme is manipulable in that actual trade is a function of stated trades. As Drazen (1980)
points out, a rationed agent may overbid in order to increase actual trade and realize
his/her desired trade. An example of overbidding, given by Muellbauer and Portes
(1978), is the placing of multiple or extra orders by constrained agents. Drazen (1980)
further points out that, if all agents behave in a similar fashion, no S SE will exist. A
uniform scheme may force persons to over-supply or over-consume, thus violating the
voluntary aspect of the trading rule; as an example, labour may be forced to work
overtime. Furthermore, a uniform scheme suggests a rationing centre and as Grandmont
(1977) points out this is synonymous to assuming a tâtonnement in quantities. If
quantities can be centrally co-ordinated, so too can prices. Consequently, quantity
constraints need never arise. The stochastic scheme conforms to reality and is more
plausible in a situation where a constrained agent either gets his demand or supply
completely satisfied, or gets nothing at all."^
Honkapohja and Ito (1985) extended Muellbauer's and Portes' model (1978) by
using a stochastic rationing scheme as opposed to a deterministic rationing scheme. The
contribution of Muellbauer and Portes (1978) was to include inventories in their static
disequilibrium model. A forerunner to these models was the Barro and Grossman (1971)
general (static) disequilibrium model.^ These are two-market models, taking into
4
See Svensson (1980), Benassy (1982), Green (1980), Honkapohja and Ito (1985) and Hey (1981)
for worked numerical examples of the various schemes.
5
The Barro and Grossman (1971) model is a synthesis of the analyses of Patinkin (1956) and
Glower (1965). These evolved out of a reinterpretation of Keynes, theory in which they argue that
Keynesian theory is best interpreted as a disequilibrium theory. Contributions to this line of thought
have also been made by Malinvaud (1977).

account the spillover effect of dissatisfied demand or supply in one market into other
markets. The short-side rule is made explicit in these models, except in the Barro and
Grossman model, where it is implied. This rule, however, has some further problems.
Benassy (1982, pl2) makes the point that the short-side rule, when applied to a multimarket economy, will lead to inconsistent transactions, violating either feasibility or the
budget constraints of the agents. Consider a "firm in a situation of excess demand for its
inputs and outputs. Since there is excess demand in the input markets, the firm
purchases fewer inputs than its Walrasian demand. However, since there is excess
demand in the output markets and the firm is a seller, sales or output should equal the
Wakasian supplies. The application of the short-side rule would thus call for producing
the Walrasian inputs - a technologically unfeasible situation. Analogously, imagine a
household facing excess supply for the goods it purchases and the goods it sells. Under
the short-side rule, its sales would be lower than its Walrasian supplies but its purchases
would be equal to its Walrasian demands. As a result this household's transactions
would violate the budget constraint". Consequentiy, the theory of exchange and demand
needs to be reformulated.
"If agents are rationed in one market, their actions in other markets, where they
still have freedom to transact as they wish, are likely to change as a result. This gives
rise to an important distinction between notional [Wakasian] and effective demands or
supplies. The notional demand for goods by households, for example, is the quantity
they would like to buy, at the going set of [equilibrium] prices and wages, if they are able
to achieve their desired trades in all markets. If they are not [able to achieve their desired
trades] as a result, let us say, of excess supply prevailing in the labour market, their
effective demand for goods will be the amount they wish to buy, once they know that
they will be unable to seU all the labour time they want" (Sinclair, 1987, p66). Labour is
quantity-constrained in the labour market, which will spill over and impact on the goods
or product market. Likewise, a firm's effective demand for labour is influenced by sales
constraints that a firm faces in the product market.

Subsequently, a body of literature has evolved which draws a distinction between
notional (Walrasian) and effective demand. Generally, effective demand is defined as
demand expressed in the market, taking into account quantity constraints. Varían (1975,
p218) succinctly explains that the "demands actually presented in the market i.e., the
demands that affect price movements, are not Walrasian demands. Rather they are
effective demands; these demands are a function of both price and quantity signals." On
the other hand, the notional demand for consumer goods (Q) assumes that labour, in
attempting to maximize utility [U = f(Q,Ls)], can sell as much labour (Ls) as they
desire,(Hanratty and Vipond, 1982, pi70). The utility function is based on the notion
that households, in a Walrasian model, make simultaneous decisions about how much
labour time to supply and how much output to demand or consume; this is termed the
dual decision hypothesis by Glower (1965). The effective demand for final goods
assumes that labour is quantity-constrained; labour can sell only as much labour time as
the product market demands. Effective demand for goods by households is derived by
re-specifying the utility function with quantity constraints; there are a number of variants
of this within the literature of disequilibrium. All the above authors employ this
distinction in their models.^
Fixed-price disequilibrium (i.e. SSE) theory is not without difficulties. Given a
two-market model and a vector of disequilibrium prices and wages, four regimes that
have evolved from disequilibrium literature can be identified. The two of particular
relevance are:
i)
(New)Keynesian unemployment, and
ii) Neo-Classical unemployment.
6
The theory of effective demand is quite extensive. Briefly, however, there are two types of
effective demands: (i) the Drke (1975) and (ii) Clower (1965) demands. The Drke (1975) demand is
where an agent maximizes utility by incorporating all quantity constraints, i.e. quantity constraints in the
market the agent is trading in and all other markets. This effective demand, however, does not yield a
measure of disequilibrium in that effective demand will equal effective supply. The Clower (1965)
effective demand is the demand expressed in one market but taking into account quantity constraints in all
other markets. While Clower (1965) gives a measure of disequilibrium, it does not emerge from
optimizing behaviour. For a detailed analysis see Green (1980) and Honkapohja and Ito (1985). The
latter, therefore, employ a stochastic rationing scheme because, as they remark, it provides a "natural
measure of market imbalances and consistent micro-foundations of effective demands" (Honkapohja and
Ito, 1985, p67). Barro and Grossman (1971), Malinvaud (1977) and Portes and Muellbauer (1978)
employ Glower's (1965) concept of effective demand.

Neo-Classical economics, with respect to the labour market, breaks from the Wakasian
(equilibrium) framework and permits, as implied by Pigou, degrees of disequilibrium due
to institutional factors; excess labour (involuntary unemployment) arises from excess real
wages due to unions and/or central wage determining processes. (New)Keynesian j
theory embraces a dynamic disequilibrium (non-tatonnement) framework, in which real
wages are flexible, yet involuntary (Keynesian) unemployment can still be extracted.
Institutional factors are not the underlying explanation of involuntary unemployment.
This line of theorizing is pursued in section 2.3. In contrast the Neo-Keynesian theory,
as exemplified by Hick's IS-LM model, is essentially an equilibrium framework,
sometimes called the Neo-Classical synthesis. The only way to extract Keynesian
unemployment is to impose, for example, the assumption of money wage rigidity;
however, the difference between Neo-Classical and Neo-Keynesian unemployment
becomes unclear. The Neo-Classical and (New)Keynesian theories are both embedded in
a disequilibrium framework.
Post-Keynesian economics, led by Joan Robinson and Piero Sraffa, revolves
around the Cambridge controversies on capital (Clarke, 1989/90, pi61), and focuses on
income distributions, (Canterbery, 1987, p274). Sraffa modernized some thoughts of
the Classical economists by revamping Ricardo's labour theory of value and emphasizing
the circularity of the production process; Sraffa's contribution to Post-Keynesian thought
is sometimes called Neo-Ricardian.

Post-Keynesian theorizing also embraces

disequilibrium; (New)Keynesian and Post-Keynesian theories to this extent overlap.
Presented in table 2.1 is (New)Keynesian and Neo-Classical unemployment where the
nature of the product market is made explicit
The bar denotes effective supply (S ) or demand (D). The absence of a bar
subscript denotes Walrasian (notional) supply and demand in the respective markets. The
symbols in the brackets provide an alternative specification of disequilibrium:
equilibrium would be denoted by for example, LD = LS and therefore LD = (LD)

TABLE 2.1

(1) (New)Keynesian
unemployment
(2)

Neo-Classical
unemployment

F^gim^S
Labour
market (L)

Product
market (Q)

LD<LS

QD<QS

(LD<LD)

(QD<QD)

LD<LS
(LD < LD)

QD>QS

(Qs < Qs)

(effective demand equals notional demand). The distinction between (New)Keynesian
and Neo-Classical scenarios is quite clear. While in both the Neo-Classical and
(New)Keynesian scenarios, output is insufficient to clear the labour market, the
underlying cause is quite different. This is apparent in the diagrammatical (2.3)
representation of the respective product markets. For (New)Keynesians, product prices
are too high to clear the product and hence labour markets (Layard and Nickell, 1985).
In a Walrasian framework trade will only occur in equilibrium (Qd = Qs)» and generate
Qd> but assuming disequilibrium, effective demand for output (Qd) can be less than Qd
(Part A). Sinclair (1987, p67) elaborates: (New)Keynesian unemployment is
characterized by excess supply in both the labour and product markets. This position is
reached by starting from a Walrasian equilibrium and raising the price level. "Firms will
react to the cut in the real wage that a higher price level implies, when the money wage is
given, by wanting to employ more people and sell more output. This will be the change
in its notional demand and supply. But it will be frustrated... A higher price level
...[ceteris paribus]... means a fall in the households' real financial wealth.
[Households] will seek to cut back their spending. We have asumed that consumption
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bears a constant proportionate relation to their real money holdings... Firms will
perceive that they are forced to accept a reduced volume of sales, despite the incentive to
increase production that the higher price level brought... They simply cannot sell
everything which it is profitable to produce at the new price level". A corollary to this
scenario, which will be developed in section 2.3, is that a reduction in the real wage is
not sufficient to reduce unemployment; "in the Great Depression, prices and wages did
fall" (Frank, 1986, p8).
In the Neo-Classical regime the real wage is artificially forced up or kept high,
resulting in excess demand on the product market; the supply curve has shifted to the
left and settled at Qs in Part B of diagram 2.3. An increase in price will restore
equilibrium in a Neo-Classical framework in both the labour and product market; real
wages will decline and output would expand along Qs in part B of diagram 2.3. In
contrast, an increase in price will exacerbate (New)Keynesian unemployment.
It is apparent from Levacic and Rebmann (1988) that underlying the
(New)Keynesian regime is the analysis of Patinkin (1956, 1965), where real wages
move pro-cyclically. The particular importance of Patinkin's analysis, along with
Glower's (1965) dual decision hypothesis, is that it provides consistency between microeconomics and macro-economics. Grandmont et.al. (1978, p84) state that
"disequilibrium paves the way for a reconciliation between micro and macro theory". For
example, deriving a household's demand for goods from a utility function, which
includes quantity constraints, yields micro (household) demand functions similar to the
form of an aggregate consumption function. Patinkin's disequilibrium interpretation of
Keynes also clarifies the elusive concept of involuntary unemployment. Briefly,
involuntary unemployment may exist at equilibrium wages; that is, LD< LD while LD =
Ls. For this to occur firms (and labour) must be off their respective curves, and the
labour market may be characterized by a non-clearing equilibrium price of labour. These
issues are addressed in the next section, where it is also shown that the Keynesian
analysis is best embraced by a dynamic disequilibrium framework.

2.3

2.3.1

(ISEW)KFYNESÏAN PCONQMICS;

Kevnes and Non-Tatonnement
A conclusion reached by the Neo-Classical economists was that cyclical economic
upturns are inversely related to the real wage rate. Patinkin (1956, 1965) using a
disequilibrium framework, alters this conclusion. Moreover, unemployment is generated
through insufficient output without placing restrictions on the movement of the real wage,
thus providing an unambiguous definition of involuntary unemployment; the non-clearing
equilibrium real wage means labour is off its labour supply function. A disequilibrium
approach to Keynes is, according to Benassy (1982, p2), the relevant framework. He
states: "macroeconomic models in the Keynesian tradition...violate the main
characteristics of equilibrium economics: (i) since the labour market [exhibits]
unemployment, at least one market is not in equilibrium, (ii) some adjustments are not
brought about by price movements alone, e.g. the goods market is equilibriated through
movements in the level of national income [quantity] and finally, (iii) agents do not react
only to price signals e.g., the Keynesian consumption function depends on the level of
income".
ThelS-LM framework and its notions of equilibrium is not Keynes. Hey (1981,
p204) remarks: "the demand for labour function in the standard IS-LM model is the
usual marginal product of labour curve; this embodies the implicit assumption of
unconstrained behaviour". Patinkin (1956, 1965) criticizes this underiying assumption
of the Classical/Keynesian labour demand curve, and evolves a theory of the labour
market where unemployment is seen to be a consequence of disequilibrium. Position B
in Diagram 2.4 implies that the firm is not quantity-constrained in the output market and
can sell all that it can produce (Kennedy, 1985). In microeconomics, labour demand
functions
show
the
quantity
of
labour

Diagram 2.4
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Controversy exists over Keynes' labour market. That is, is the labour supply function solely a
function of money wages? "Leontief (1937) maintained that Keynes had assumed that workers
were subject to money illusions" (Addison and Burton, 1982, p3). However, "the nearest
....Keynes comes to a precise formulation of the crucial issue is his assertion that the supply of
labour depends not upon real but (also) upon money wages" (Ibid, p4). This paper assumes that
labour may not suffer from money illusion and therefore accepts Patinkin's supply of labour
function as a function of real wages.

demanded by firms, at given real wage levels, assuming that firms can sell all the output
they desire at the prevailing product price. Points on a labour demand function assume
that firms are not quantity-constrained. For example, a given level of employment
implies a
given level of output; a higher level of employment, captured as a movement down a
labour demand function, implies a higher level of output. Increased employment levels
will only occur if the extra output is sold. Points on the labour demand function,
therefore, imply unconstrained behaviour in terms of firms choosing employment and
output levels without hindrance; i.e. no sales constraint. Patinkin (1956, 1965), derives
an effective demand for labour (LD) function for a given level of demand for output.
Notional demand for labour is denoted (LD). This is the amount of labour demanded,
assuming that the product market is in equilibrium. Note that Patinkin does not employ
these terms.
Following Barro and Grossman (1971), a representative firm perceives that it is
neither output- (i.e. sales-) nor labour-constrained, and maximizes profit (TI) given by
N = QS-WLD,

(3)

where Q and W denote the quantity of output and the real wage respectively, and the
subscripts denote supply (S) and demand (D).
Assuming a production function of the simple form,
Q = F(L),
(4)
profit maximization is given by,
dF
LD = L(W), such that ^ =W,
which implies diminishing marginal productivity. Thus, the notional supply of output is
a function of the notional demand for labour: QS = F(LD). This analysis is captured at
point E in Diagram 2.4 which was also discussed in Section 2.1. There are no quantity
constraints, hence labour and firms trade on their supply and demand curves, where
perceived constraints are zero and are equal to actual constraints. In other words, in

deriving afirm'sdemand for labour mathematically it is assumed that thefirmcan sell as
much output it produces.
In contrast, suppose that thefirmis now output-constrained and cannot sell all of
its notional supply (Qs). Then commodities in the product market are in excess supply,
so that the actual sale of output (QD) (effective consumption demand) is less than notional
demand (QD < QD» refer to diagram 2.3, part A). Hence, given (QD) the firm maximizes
K (given by ABWi in diagram 2.4), by
7C = QD - WLD

subject to equation (4). The effective demand for labour becomes,
LD = F-l(QD)for^> W.
Since the product market is not in equilibrium the effective demand for labour (LD) will
be less than the notional demand for labour (LD).
The essence of Patinkin's (1956, 1965) analysis is that excess supply of output
(QD < QD) causes excess supply of labour (LD < LD), and wages may now move procyclically with the trade cycle. Barro and Grossman (1971) start their scenario by
supposing that product demand is too low (QD < QD). The consequence is excess supply
of labour at point Z. The effective labour demand becomes ABLD ( Q). TO the extent
that real wages respond to (LD < LD), real wages will fall towards W3, or point F.
Suppose now that some policy action is taken to restore effective product demand, then a
rising real wage will accompany a rise in employment and output, thus closing the gap
fi-om ZE to GE.
Within this analysis the concept of involuntary unemployment is no longer vague.
In a Walrasian framework (where notional supply and demand is used) involuntary
unemployment may only exist above W®, such as at W^. Keynesian involuntary
unemployment can be captured by the gap BC. Yet, in another sense it is difficult to
avoid the proposition that the gap BC constitutes voluntary unemployment, to the extent
that the excessive real wage is the cause of unemployment and workers resist a decline in
real wages. Even with Keynes' proposition, where workers' resistance to a lower

money wage keeps the real wage high, the gap BC could be considered as voluntary
unemployment. This vagueness is overcome since at point Z unemployment is uniquely
due to variations in output: the real wage is unchanged. The real cause of unemployment
is insufficient product demand.

Stimulating output would reduce involuntary

unemployment as illustrated by a shift from point Z to point G.
The labour demand function, therefore, should have output explicitly as a righthand side variable. Involuntary unemployment is given by the gap ZE. If wages decline
to W3 (point F) then involuntary unemployment is replaced by voluntary unemployment.
Hughes and Perlman (1984, p68), make an important point that although Barro and
Grossman (1971) "see the possibility of point F being attained, they do not argue that it
will be an unstable real wage".

A reduction in real wages does not decrease

unemployment, but only changes its nature. A real wage in excess of W® is (in Barro
and Grossman's words) a type of Neo-Classical involuntary unemployment. They state:
"no stimulation of [product] demand could bring about full employment equilibrium,
unless real wages were reduced" (Barro and Grossman, 1971, p87). In other words a
reduction in real wages is not sufficient to generate full employment, as the economy may
move from point B to point Z. This is Keynesian in the sense that product demand is
insufficient; however, it is Neo-Classical to the extent that a necessary pre-requisite for
effective stimulation of product demand is the reduction of the real wage overhang.
Indecs (1986, p80) provides some indication that Australia may be experiencing NeoClassical involuntary unemployment. The authors state: "the near abolition of the
overhang in 1980 brought only a minor fall in unemployment, and its complete abolition
in 1984 still left unemployment at around 8 per cent of 1985, a long way above the preoverhang, full employment levels". Furthermore, Hanratty and Vipond (1982, p203),
illustrate "how [NewJKeynesian and [Neo]-Classical unemployment can emerge at the
same time... Demand expansion alone...could not produce full employment; real-wage
cuts would also be required".
Clower (1965) demonstrates that the Keynesian consumption function too is a
consequence of trading in disequilibrium. Hey (1981, p203) makes the point that the

"consumption function remains an essentially ad hoc construct"; and often the microfoundations are not specified. Analogously to Patinkin (1956, 1965), Glower (1965),
presents the consumption function as a manifestation of disequilibrium in the labour
market based on micro-foundations. Barro and Grossman (1971) demonstrate how a
representative household maximizes utility given, that consumers are constrained in
purchasing output and selling its labour. Income becomes exogenously determined.
Gasson (1981, p34) remarks that, once it is recognized that trade occurs out of
equilibrium, the exogeneity of income in the consumption function is the correct
specification. "When money wages are too high households face a constraint on their
supply of labour. As a result of this, income becomes exogenous to the household". In
explaining Glower's (1965) position, Barro and Grossman (1971) make quantityconstraints explicit, so that workers cannot sell as much labour time as they would like.
The IS-LM and income-expenditure models recognize that excess labour has
repercussions in the product market by entering realized (effective) income in the
consumption function as a separate argument, but ignore the repercussions of excess
output on the labour market by specifying labour demand as a function of real wages
only. This not only explains the unrealistic countercyclical prediction of real wages, but
as Hey (1981) points out, makes the IS-LM framework internally inconsistent; labour is
constrained but firms are not constrained when effective income is less than notional
income. Finally, within the IS-LM framework, if a rigid wage causes unemployment
then a reduction in the real wage would cure unemployment. Keynes (1936) denied this
conclusion yet, if real wages are flexible, involuntary unemployment should not arise.
This inconsistency can be overcome if Keynes' (1936) theory is interpreted as a dynamic
disequilibrium analysis where real wages may vary but rarely reach equilibrium.
Kennedy (1979) and Wells (1977) voice a similar opinion. Kennedy (1979, p213) states
that "Keynes treated a [position of less than full employment] as an equilibrium because it
is a state of rest for the economy. Defining equilibrium not as a position of rest, but as a
position in which all markets are cleared gives the alternative disequilibrium
nomenclature". Moreover, Ackley (1961) supposes that "Keynes admitted some

departure from the assumption of a completely rigid money wage" (Addison and Burton,
1982, p5). Rees (1970, p308) also embraced the Keynesian notion that even with
flexible wages aggregate demand would be further reduced if there was a general
reduction in the worker's wage. Consequently, the decline in money wages which
occurred during the great depression may not have cleared the labour market. This line of
thought is developed in the following section.
2.3.2

Dynamic Disequilibrium Theory and Kevnes
This section will demonstrate that, within a dynamic disequilibrium framework
and despite the removal of the assumption of rigid downward money wages, it is still
possible to extract Keynesian propositions. In particular, unemployment is a function of
output and a general reduction of money wages will not cure unemployment. At the same
time it will be demonstrated that full employment equilibrium theories. Classical and NeoKeynesian (exemplified by the income-expenditure and IS-LM models), are not
dissimilar. Only within a non-tatonnement framework does a clear distinction emerge.
An interpretation present in the literature on disequilibrium economics is that
disequilibrium theory may be seen as filling in the theoretical gaps of Neo-Keynesian
models. Briefly, these models have accepted that labour is a derived demand and
consumption (demand for output) is a function of effective (actual) income; they merely
failed to elaborate on the underlying quantity-constrained maximization behaviour of
economic agents. These micro-foundations have been addressed by Barro and Grossman
(1971), Muellbauer and Portes (1978) and Hankapohja and Ito (1985). It is equally true,
however, that non-tatonnement theory may render Neo-Keynesian (equilibrium) models,
as voiced in Section 2.3.1, internally inconsistent, and that Walrasian theory is a unique
case of non-tatonnement theory.
The proposition that only within a non-tâtonnement framework does a clear
distinction manifest between Classical theory and Keynes is developed by reference to
Table 2.2, where Q, C, I and r denote respectively notional quantity, consumption,
investment and the interest rate. The Neo-Keynesian and Classical theories are very
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TABLE 2.2
Comparison of Eauilihriiiin and Nnn-T^tnnngment Theories
Non*tatonnexnent

Walrasian (equilibrium) framcworic
Classical(full)
employment theory

Neo-Keynesian (full
employment) txxxiel

New Keynesian
(Unemployment) model

Labour

Ls = g(W)

(1)

Ls = g(W)

(7)

Ls = g(W)

(13)

market

LD = g(W)

(2)

LD = g(W)

(8)

LB = g(Q)

(14)

L = Ls = Ld

(3)

L = Ls = LD

(9)

LD^LD

(15)

(4)

(5s = q(L)

(10)

Qs = q(LB)

(16)

Product ( ^ = q(L)
market

QD = C(r) + I(r) (5)
Qs = QD= Q

QD = C(Q)-Kl(r) (11) QD = C(Q)-^I(r) (17)

(6) (5S = QD= Q

(12)

Qs=(5D(QD'^QD)(18)
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Source: Adapted from Hairis, H. (1981), Monetary Theory, pp.153-161.

similar (except for the consumption function) where equilibrium occurs when Q = Q and
thus L = L. In other words, the notional supply of output (labour) equals the notional
demand for output (labour). There are no quantity constraints; hence effective output
(Q) equals notional output (Q), and all planned trades are realized. There are thus no
involuntary inventories or unemployment; firms trade on their labour demand curves and
workers trade on their supply curves simultaneously in equilibrium. Significantly, within
the (Walrasian) equilibrium framework there is no clear distinction between Qassical and
Neo-Keynesian labour markets. If one considers positions of involuntary
(disequilibrium) unemployment, the system of equations needs to be altered. This
alteration highlights the point that Walrasian theory is a unique case within the economics
of disequilibrium.
The production function, (4) and (10), is a special case of (16); the production
function is a locus of effective output ^ and labour (L), of which there is one unique
point which constitutes full employment (i.e. L" = L). Consequently, the relevant demand
for labour will be determined by the effective level of output (14). In a disequilibrium
framework, (New)Keynesian steady-state equilibrium (SSE) occurs when effective output
(Q) is less than notional (full employment) output (Q). SSE is defined (in (18)) as
equality between effective supply of output (Qs) and effective demand for output (QD).
Note that SSE in the labour market is determined by (New)Keynesian SSE in the product
market. Walrasian equilibrium in the labour market is non-existent and according to
Patinkin (1956, 1965) effective demand for labour (17) becomes a function of effective
output
Significantly, only within a non-tatonnement framework does one obtain a
clear distinction between Keynesian and Neo-Classical propositions.
This is more clear in the graphical analysis (Diagram 2.5), where point Z denotes a
(New)Keynesian situation and point B describes a Neo-Classical situation; BZ captures
Neo-Classical involuntary unemployment. In quadrant I (Walrasian) full employment is
given by Q = Q", where notional output (Q) equals effective output ( Q). The broken line
captures the Classical and Neo-Classical demand for output. It is vertical because
QD (C +1) is determined by r only ( and r in turn is a function neither of (C +1) nor (Qs).

When the aggregate demand curve intersects the 45° line at Ei, there exists excess notional
supply equal to (Ei - F3). This is an unstable position and Say's Law (i.e. where saving
and investment is equilibriated by r) ensures (Walrasian) full employment at Fi,
(QD = QS = Q ) .

In the (New)Keynesian scenario effective consumption is a function of effective
income. They are considered to be effective aggregates, because they are a manifestation
of quantity constraints. The consumption function is positive, reflecting a direct
relationship between consumption and income. Position Hi reflects excess notional
supply; however, since trade occurs out of equilibrium, effective demand QD (C + I) is
less than notional demand, QD (C +1). Following Patinkin (1956, 1965) both firms and
workers move off their respective curves in the labour market: point Z. Position Fi is a
unique position along a loci of disequilibrium points on the 45° line where QD = QDPoint El is where effective demand, QD (C +1), is equal to effective supply (Qs).
The graphical analysis, however, also highlights the tendency toward full
employment. In order to extract Keynesian conclusions, that is, persistent disequilibrium
unemployment, three special assumptions are required: (i) the liquidity trap; (ii) interestinelastic demand functions; and (iii) rigid money wages. Imposing these assumptions,
however, in an attempt to contrast the Classical model and Keynes is unfortunate, as it
renders (New)Keynesian theory similar to the Wakasian doctrine, in particular the full
employment Neo-Keynesian model. If the analysis was not static, then within an
equilbrium framework the labour market would adjust to point E2 and remove involuntary
unemployment. These three assumptions, and in particular money wage rigidity,
necessitate the Walrasian policy prescription for solving unemployment: a decrease in
money wages. This Keynes denied. Moreover, Weintraub (1975, p540) makes the point
that Keynes' investment demand function is interest-sensitive, "since the demand price of a
capital good is, by the MEC schedule, inversely proportional to the interest rate, what
Keynes argued is that an increase in the interest rate subsumed a fall in bond prices and
thus, by substitutability, a fall in the quantity of capital assets demanded. Thus the
investment demand schedule was interest-elastic". This is not the same as assumption (ii).

Diagram
Dynamic Analysis of Patinkin's Labour Market
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Wages
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NB: A pleasing result of this dynamic analysis is that a general reduction of money
wages will not reduce the level of unemployment As Lekachman (1969» p75)
states: "any observer at ail in touch with social reality of the 1930 s knew that quite
hiequently wages and employment had contracted simultaneously". The proposition
by Keynes is illustrated by reference to point B. While a real wage overhang is
the cause of unemployment, a consequential reduction in the money wage will ooove
the labour market to point Z. Since wages form a significant portion of aggrepte
demand,firmsbecome quantity-constrained. Lekachman (1969, p77) again explains:
"when wages in general fall, then the demand for all varieties of consumer goods
and services falls in tune with the declining incomes of workers. At best, then the
demand for goods must fall in much the same proportion as wages... C^e employer
can benfit from a reduction of his worker's wages [and therefore costs]. All
workers cannot benefit by a general reduction. To believe otherwise is to commit
a fallacy of composition." A Neo-Classical scenario is where tiie economy moves
horn point B to position E because firms are not quantity-constndned; prices are
flexible downwards.

Indeed the liquidity trap does not appear to be a prevalent phenomenon. The distinction
between Walrasian and Neo-Keynesian models is not clear.
The imposition of these assumptions is required because of the nature of the
framework: i.e. static (or comparative static) analysis. The assumptions are not required
within a dynamic disequilibrium framework, where wages become endogenous and are
allowed to be flexible but rarely, if ever, reaching equilibrium and thus preserving the
existence of Keynesian involuntary (disequilibrium) unemployment. This process is
illustrated in diagram 2.6. The implication to reduce involuntary unemployment is not to
decrease the real wage by reducing the money wage, but rather to stimulate output. It has
been argued that within a static disequilibrium framework, demand for output manifests
itself in the labour demand function. Real wages did not enter the demand function
because they were fixed, but became relevant in the Neo-Classical framework because they
were endogenous. Within a dynamic disequilibrium framework both output and real
wages are relevant. Real wages are now endogenous, but may not equilibriate the labour
market; this leaves output as a relevant variable.
This is demonstrated in the following diagram, (2.6). For ease of exposition
assume that the price is constant atPo-

Following Patinkin (1956,1965), involuntary

unemployment is initially given by ZE. Assuming that the market dominates the wage
determination process, then money wages (and in this example, real wages too) are forced
down toward equilibrium.

But as this occurs equilibrium may move from Ei to E2. A

moving equilibrium is the essence of dynamic disequilibrium which is assumed to be a
characteristic of the real world. The estimation procedure, developed in the following
section, according to Bowden (1978a), assumes a moving equilibrium. Involuntary
wo
unemployment is now Z\Ei. In turn real wages are forced down to p ^ a n d involuntary
unemployment is given by Z2E2. Involuntary unemployment has not been eliminated as
would be the case in a Walrasian framework; if the reduction in the real wage is
accompanied by an increase in aggregate demand, perhaps due to a decrease in product
price, then involuntary unemployment would be reduced as point Z2 approaches E2.
Sinclair (1987, p68) states: "(New)Keynesian unemployment can be removed by bringing

the price of goods down to its Walrasian level, and correcting the money wage rate if it has
also strayed [from equilibrium]". In essence, therefore, involuntary unemployment may
exist when wages (both money and real) are flexible. In a pure equilibrium framework real
wages enter the labour demand equation, while in a fixed-wage disequilibrium regime
output enters the demand equation. When both output and wages are allowed to vary, both
wages and output enter the demand equation only within a dynamic disequilibrium
framework. The distinction between (New)Keynesian and Neo-Classical scenarios is
therefore a matter of degree; the relative speeds of wages and employment toward
equilibrium are the criteria for distinguishing between these doctrines.
As previously explained, however, dynamics implies non-optimizing behaviour,
and as Hey (1981) remarks, dynamic models require a departure from optimality (i.e.
choice-theory). As a consequence models become behavioural and are based on
reasonable rules of behaviour. From this perspective, a price equation of the form
[Pt - Pt-i = f(D - S)] as used by Fair and Jaffee (1971) may be an appropriate appendage to
their market model. The thinking behind the equation is simple; if there is excess supply
price will tend to fall, and vice-versa. (As pointed out in Section 2.2, using the above
price equation in conjunction with the short side rule is inconsistent).
On the other hand, optimality (choice-theory) is not forsaken when a price equation
takes the form of the Partial Adjustment Model (PAM). According to Griliches (1967) the
basic premise of the PAM is that there are costs to adjustment which justify the observed
inertia or sluggishness of endogenous variables, such as employment. The PAM provides
a basis for optimal-adjustment theory. Following Griliches (1967), firms incur two costs:
(i) the cost of trading in disequilibrium (i.e. forgone profit) and (ii) the cost of change
(adjustment). It is not costless, for example, for a firm to adjust its labour stock to
variations in product demand; output therefore may vary more than employment. If both
cost functions are approximated by quadratics, then the loss function becomes
L = a(St-Set)2 + b(St-St.i)2
where S®t is the desired equilibrium level. Minimizing L by differentiating with respect to
St and setting to zero gives:

dL
a s = 2a(St - S^t) + 2b(St - Sn) = 0
^

St =

+

(St-l)

St - St-l = ^

(Set-St.i)

St-St-l = mCSet - St-l)
where m =

This states that the higher the adjustment cost the slower the rate of

adjustment. Of course, there are other reasons why complete adjustment is not achieved
in a single period, such as economic and social institutions (including the conjectural
theory as explained in section 2.2), persistence of habit, and poor information flows.
Consequently, in this thesis an economic technique with partial adjustment toward
a moving equilibrium is adopted; a partial adjustment equation will replace the equilibrium
condition in the labour market (i.e. LS = LD). Both L and W will adjust toward
equilibrium, but only partially. This technique has been developed by Chow (1983).
The Chow (1983) procedure has the advantage of avoiding the use of the short-side rule.
The short-side rule implies an unusual asymmetric adjustment. The rule suggests that
effective labour demand (X") overshoots the new equilibrium during and economic
downturn (Sarantis, 1981, cited in Rao, 1983), but does not overshoot equilibrium
during an economic upturn. Suppose, as in Diagram 2.7, the labour demand function
shifts to L^D, then adjustment as dictated by the short-side rule may be from point A to
point C. Employment does not overshoot the new equilibrium (J) during an
expansionary adjustment phase. In contrast, as the labour demand function shifts to Ld^
effective labour demand overshoots the new equilibrium (G) because employment settles
at X i , point A. Other short-comings of this rule have been addressed in previous
sections.
If the labour market as dictated by the short-side rule was initially at point C and
labour demand shifted to L^D, the short-side rule again dictates that employment will fall
to Li (point A). This highlights other assumptions underlying the adjustment to point A.

Diagram 2.7
The Labour Market: In nisequilihrium

Real
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Walrasian (nodonal) labour demand curve
Walrasian (nodonal) labour supply curve
Effecdve labour demand curve, where i = 1...5

Adjustment of employment by a firm to point A assumes little or no cost to the firm in
adjusting its labour stock, and that firms are not sales-constrained (since point A is on the
firm's labour demand function).
If there are significant costs to the firm to retrench and re-hire labour, however,
then labour may be less sensitive to variations in the demand for output. Firms,
therefore, may hoard labour during an economic downtum if they expect the downturn to
be temporary. Consequently, a firm may not adjust its labour stock to Li (point A), but
to somewhere in between such as point E; the firm is off its labour demand function.
Adjustment to point A assumes that the firm is not quantity-constrained and there are litde
costs to the firm in reducing labour. Furthermore, adjustment to point E (and A) also
assumes no real wage adjustment; if real wages are flexible downwards, since the
effective demand for labour (L2 at point E) is less than the notional demand for labour (L3
at point G), then adjustment will lie somewhere between points E and H. Point F implies
unconstrained behaviour and point H depicts voluntary unemployment, but this is
probably an unstable situation. Any adjustment of labour by firms that does not extend to
Li implies some degree of labour hoarding, which may be defined as the
deliberate under-utilization of a firm's labour stock because it may retain more labour than
is required to produce a given level of output. In short, assuming: (i) firms are quantityconstrained and therefore operate off their labour demand functions (Patinkin, 1956,
1965); (ii) there are significant costs to firms to adjust their labour stocks; and, (iii) real
wages are flexible; adjustment may be from Z to Z\ or somewhere in between.
Therefore, embodied in a partial adjustment equation, unlike the short-side rule, is
Patinkin's (1956, 1965) analysis and the theory of labour hoarding. An econometric
procedure that employs the partial adjustment equation and discards the short-side rule is
theoretically desirable. The Chow (1983) method also provides a method of measuring
the relative speeds of adjustment of employment and wages toward equilibrium. In
summarizing, Neo-Classical and (New)Keynesian labour market theories are both
characterized by non-tatonnement; disequilibrium in tum implies dynamics and therefore
the adjustment of the endogenous variables. The distinction between Neo-Classical and

(New)Keynesian economics is a matter of degree. If the real wage adjusts all but
instantaneously during a disequilibrium phase, then the labour market may be
characterized by a Neo-Classical framework. Underlying a Neo-Classical framework is,
perhaps, labour hoarding, since employment is not a significant source of adjustment
toward equilibrium. Labour dis-hoarding may allow employment to adjust more rapidly
than the price of labour. The econometrics of disequilibrium and Chow's (1983)
procedure is discussed in detail in 2.4. Section 2.5, in summarizing this chapter, also
discusses labour hoarding in relation to Chow's (1983) estimation technique.

2.4 NON-TÂTONNEMENT ESTIMATION PROCEDURES

The significance of non-tâtonnement economics for estimation is that it will
determine the structure, specification and estimation procedure of a model. Econometric
models revolve around the multi-equation or single-equation framework, which reflect
the equilibriating nature of right-hand side variables (i.e. endogeneity of some variables
in a multi-equation framework) or the exogeneity of the right-hand side variables in a
single-equation framework.
Trivedi and Baker (1985) criticize the estimation of the expectations augmented
Phillips curve of the form:
Pj = (Ut-U^O + aPt*
(1)
where Pt and Pt* denote respectively actual and expected price changes and Ut and U®t
denote actual unemployment and the Natural Rate of Unemployment (NRU)."^ Briefly,
the NRU is given by the intersection of supply and demand curves in the labour market;
more precisely the point of intersection of the traditional Phillips curve with the
unemployment axis where the rate of price inflation is zero. This may be viewed as a
unique case of the Non-Accelerating Inflationary Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU),
where a positive (but constant) rate of price inflation is associated with equilibrium in the
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Note that Trivedi and Baker (1985) refrainedfromusing the term NRU as defined by Friedman,
because of what they see as vagueness and ambiguities in his defmition.

labour market. Positive non-constant price inflation exists when Ut diverges from U®t;
thus the term (Ut - U®t) is a surrogate for aggregate demand.
Trivedi and Baker (1985, p630-31) make the point that "since U®t is a general
equilibrium concept its solution values ought to be derived from the solution of an
economy wide model in which the expectations-augmented Phillips curve is embedded.
[Moreover], market clearing assumptions...[make]...results either uninteresting or not
meaningful when one wants to obtain the time path of unemployment given sluggish
wage-price adjustment and 'continuous' non-marketing clearing".
Assuming the short-side rule, Trivedi and Baker (1985) proceed to estimate a
short-run (cyclical) unemployment (U^) equation of the general form^
UC =

S, T)

(2)

W and —
Q
where S and T denote search and structural unemployment respectively. —
capture real wage and output (insufficient aggregate demand) gaps, where e denotes
equilibrium values, and W and Q denote observed values. Since W® and Q® are
unobservable within a disequilibrium framework, measurement difficulties arise. This
difficulty is avoided with the Chow (1983) technique which will be developed in the
following section. The estimation of U® is consistent with Trivedi's and Baker's (1985)
objective of measuring cyclical unemployment, which is defined as "the rate of
unemployment that would prevail given short-run rigidity of the real wage" (Trivedi and
Baker, 1982, pi). The implied framework is static disequilibrium (i.e. SSE). Their
objective is to explain short-run variations in U®. They point out that if real wage and
demand variables are sluggish in adjustment then the single equation (as above), which
implies exogeneity of right-hand side variables, will yield a fruitful explanation of shortrun unemployment. If the real wage and demand (output) variables, however, were
treated as endogenous in a Wakasian spirit, additional equations would be required to
investigate unemployment fully.
Note that this is a simplified version of their equation.

In the long-run, unlike the short-run, it is reasonable to suppose that real wages
and aggregate demand variables are endogenous. Yet an estimation technique that
proceeds with these assumptions implies that equilibrium is the assumed state.
Keynesian theory is not easily tested within such a framework.
As previously argued, however, it is a conceivable and even an accurate
interpretation of Keynes, that markets (prices and real wages) do respond to supply and
demand in the long-run, but that equilibrium is rarely achieved or that disequilibrium is
more the rule than the exception. Lagged endogenous variables may accommodate the
sluggish adjustment of markets, but the procedure assumes that Walrasian equilibrium is
achieved, albeit in a sluggish manner. This procedure in itself suggests trade out of
equilibrium. Real wages may be sluggish in their adjustment because of poor
informational flows (exemplified by search behaviour), economic and social institutions.
Empirical models that support the sluggish nature of wage and employment adjustment in
the labour market are Lewis and Makepeace (1981, 1984), Smyth (1983) for the U.K.,
and both Jonson, Battellino and Campbell (1978) and Lewis and Makepeace (1985) for
Australia.
A basic model of the labour market in disequilibrium is specified below^:
BASIC MODEL

where:

QD = d(Pt, X^t) + e o

(3)

Qs = S(Pt, XSt) + es

(4)

Pt-Pt-i =f(QD-Qs) + ep
Qt = min (D,S)

(5)
(6)

D,S
Pt» Qt
X^t» XSj
CD» es, Cp

= Notional demand and supply for Q (unobserved).
= Observed price and quantity in current time period.
= Exogoneous demand and supply variables respectively.
= Error terms with Normal Classical assumptions.

9 The symbols P and Q are used here in a general sense, so that P may refer to W, and Q may refer to L.

Without equation (5), price is assumed to be exogenous. This basic model where
adjustment is free of error (ep = 0) was first estimated by Fair and Jaffee (1972).
Equations (5) and (6) have been discussed in Section 2.2. According to Fair and Jaffee
(1972, p497) "the main problem of estimation is that in the absence of an equilibrium
condition the observed quantity traded in the market may not satisfy both the supply and
demand schedule" (i.e. Qe ^^ QD ^^ Qs)- Fair and Jaffee (1972) applied the maximum
Likelihood Method (MLM) to their model, as it was appropriate in determining the
optimal apportionment of a sample of observations into demand and supply regimes.
Since this path-breaking article, subsequent literature which extends and modifies
Fair's and Jaffee's (1972) basic model has evolved. Fair and Kelejian (1974, pl77) state
that the price-adjustment equation embodies a "rather strict assumption about price setting
behaviour, namely that price changes are strictly proportional to excess demand".
Consequently, the error term (ep) was included. Also the price-adjustment equation can
be generalized into a multivariate equation. Fair and Kelejian (1974) investigated the
following equation:
Pt-Pt-l=f(QD-Qs) + XP + ep
(7)
where X^ is a cost variable. This is realistic since, in oligopoly theory, prices respond to
unit normal cost, which is affected by excess demand. Analogously, a wage-adjustment
equation may be augmented by a price variable. The inclusion of the error term (ep)
makes MLM complicated, and possibly irregular and unbounded for certain combinations
of the parameter values^o. This shortcoming has been echoed by Maddala and Nelson
(1974), Rao (1983) and Bowden (1978a).
Bowden (1978a) respecifies this basic model and allows for an investigation into
the problem of testing a model for equilibrium or disequilibrium. Equilibrium in the basic
model corresponds to f = infinity since f may assume any value other than zero, but
adjustment becomes non-operational when f = zero. This implies that various degrees of
equilibrium are described between zero and infinity. There is, therefore, no statistical test
10
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for degrees of disequilibrium, since there are no upper or lower boundaries. In other
words the value that f takes on, when estimated, is not bounded. Bowden's (1978a)
reformulation of equation (5) allows for a measure of drag, m, otherwise known as the
coefficient of friction. Briefly, Bowden (1978a) introduces an unobservable price
variable (P^t) in place of Pt in the supply and demand equations. P®t is the unobservable
equilibrium price. It is the market clearing price. Equation (5) is reformulated as:

Ft =

mPt-i + (l-m)pet + ep

(8)

where (Pt - Pt-i) is the actual adjustment and (P®t - Pt-l) is the required adjustment to
equilibriate the market. Bowden (1978a, p93) describes equation (8) as a partial moving
equilibrium model (PAMEQ). "Prices adjust each period partially to the moving
equilibrium

(Bowden, 1978a, p83).

For the market to be in continuous

equilibrium, then Ft = P^t- In terms of the coefficient of drag, when m = 0, the limiting
case of instantaneous adjustment occurs. When m = 1 there is no response by the
market. The model is now bounded, or in other words, has defined limits ranging from
zero to unity. If 0 < m < 1, only a proportion of any difference between actual and
desired balances is made up within any one time period.
Smyth (1983) estimates Bowden's PAMEQ model for the U.K. for the period
1920 - 1938. An unemployment variable was included in the supply equation which,
according to Smyth (1983), is in accordance with the Neo-Classical doctrine. This is the
same estimation period used by Benjamin and Kochin (1979), who argue that
unemployment benefits significantly raised unemployment levels in the U.K. Smyth
(1983) used the MLM (although Bowden's model can be adapted to accommodate other
estimation procedures^!).

He found that by imposing the constraint m = 0, the

constrained equilibrium version was rejected in favour of a disequilibrium framework.
Furthermore, Lewis and Makepeace (1984) rejected the hypothesis that the British labour
11
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Bowden's generalized adjusunent procedure is similar to Chow's (1983) technique.

market has been in equilibrium. Interestingly, Smyth (1983) confirmed Benjamin's and
Kochin's (1979) conclusion, and further concluded that a reduction of unemployment
benefits by about half (during the period 1925-1938) would have increased employment
by between 8% and 12%.
The analysis thus far has been concerned with one market in disequilibrium. Ito
(1980) presents a multi-market model in which spillover effects of excess demand or
supply in one market affect another market He presents a model with labour and output
markets, and demonstrates various estimation procedures (MLM, two-stage least
squares) reflecting different pricing schemes.
Common to all models was the assumption of the short-side rule: Q = min (D,S).
This rule, as briefly touched upon, has some theoretical shortcomings, since it implies
that there is no problem in information flows and this is not a characteristic of labour
markets where there exists search unemployment due to poor information flows. The
rule is appropriate only where prices (wages) are fixed institutionally; that is, where
prices and wages are not endogenous. Models with price-adjustment equations and the
short-side rule therefore represent an odd mix, although they have met with some
empirical success. As explained in section 2.2, using a price equation in conjuction with
equation (6) is inconsistent. Another shortcoming is that it does not allow for both price
and quantity adjustment. This is unfortunate, since the main focus of (dynamic)
disequilibrium economics is that quantities are a significant source of adjustment. An
estimation procedure where both price and quantities are endogenously determined
(allowed to adjust) is desirable, since their relative speed of adjustment may be measured.
Chow (1983, p246) states: "if price and other economic variables are allowed to
adjust toward an equilibrium specified by a set of simultaneous equations one can choose
the following model":
AY^t + BXt = E

(9)

Yt - Yt-i = M(Yh . Yt-i)

(10)

where
Y®t = Vector of unobserved current endogenous equilibrium variables.
Yt = Vector of observed endogenous variable in current time period.
Xt = Vector of observed exogenous variables in current time period.
A,B,M = Matrices of coefficients.
E = Error terms with Normal Classical assumptions.
The equilibrium values are unobserved because, like Bowden's PAMEQ, the
equilibrium is moving. Since the system has two equations and one unknown (Y® 0» it
can be algebraically manipulated for estimation purposes, so that all variables are
observable. Solving for Y®t in (9) allows for a substitution with (10) which conveniently
removes the unknown. Equation (9) becomes:
Y^t = A-l(-BXt + E)
and after expanding:
Y^t = -BA-lXt + A-lE
(11)
Substituting 11 into 10 yields:
Yt - Yt-i = M(-BA-lXt+ A-lE - Yn),
which can be solved now for Yt, as this is the usual position for a current endogenous
variable in regression:
Yt = -BA-lMXt + MA-lE - MYt-i + Yt-i
Factorizing gives:
Yt = -BA-lMXt + a-M)Yt.i + MA-lE
(12a)
Yt = ZiYt-i + Z2Xt+e
(12b)
where
Zi = a-M)
Z2 = -BA-lM
e = MA-lE
The estimation procedure revolves around (11), (12) and (9). It is assumed that
M, the adjustment matrix, is diagonal and some of its elements are unity. The first step in
the estimation procedure is to apply ordinary least squares (O.L.S) to obtain Z\ and Z2.

These estimates are used to generate (that is, forecast within the sample period) estimates
of Y®t through (11). In forecasting, the error term is assumed to be zero (A-^E = 0). The
estimated observations of Y®t are then used in (9) to run an appropriate regression
technique: OLS, 2SLS, or three stage least squares (3SLS). The estimates of -B and A-l
are, as noted by Chow (1983), consistent Chow (1983) further remarks that Y®t itself in
equation (10) may be lagged and M may be specified with other variables. However,
Chow (1977), cited in Rao (1983), notes that lagged endogenous variables in (9) may
render (M) unidentifiable, but these lags are unnecessary because the functional form of
equation (10) is that of the 'partial adjustment model' (P.A.M.), which captures the
sluggish nature of price and quantity adjustments.
The advantage of Chow's (1983) procedure over Bowden's (1978a) and other
procedures is that the short-side rule is not employed, that is, quantities and prices are
both a source of adjustment. Moreover, underlying the P.A.M equation, as developed by
Griliches (1967), is a choice-theoretic foundation of optimizing behaviour by economic
agents in a dynamic disequilibrium framework. Furthermore, since the short-side rule
has been discarded, it can be assumed that firms may be quantity-constrained which is
consistent with non-tâtonnement, because contrary to the implications of the short-side
rule, firms may not operate on their labour demand curves. Finally, partial adjustment
also implies the theory of labour hoarding; the short-side rule implies that there are no
costs to the firm when it alters its stock of labour.

2.5

rAROIIR HOARDTNG AND PARTTAT. AD.TUSTMENT
Historically, employment has varied less than output over the trade cycle, so that
labour productivity is high during output peaks and low during troughs. Labour
productivity tends to fall, (i.e. exhibit diminishing returns), during a downswing of the
business cycle and rise, (i.e. exhibit increasing retums), in an upswing. That is, labour
productivity moves pro-cyclically over the trade cycle. This contradicts the theoreticallyexpected result of diminishing retums during an upswing. As firms, during an upswing.

add (employ) more labour to a fixed capital stock, labour productivity is expected to
decline (i.e. exhibit decreasing returns).
The presence of (fixed) adjustment costs of hiring and displacing labour provides
a partial buffer to labour adjustment following an economic downturn. A firm need not
adjust labour immediately following a decline in the marginal value product of labour
consequent on a decline in sales (or product demand). The firm will wait to consider if
the downtum is permanent before it displaces labour. If the downturn was temporary
and labour was laid-off, then the firm will again have to incur the fixed costs involved in
re-hiring and training labour. This solves the apparent puzzle of increasing returns to
labour in an upswing. During downturns the adjustment costs of labour slow or even
prevent labour displacement, thus lowering labour productivity. In the upswing, firms
utilize unused labour time, thus raising labour productivity; consequently, labour
productivity moves pro-cyclically over the trade cycle.
One of the early attempts to accommodate adjustment costs in a short-run demand
for labour was that of Brechling (1965) where:

and

N^t = f(Qt)

(1)

Nt-Nt-i = XiN^f Nt-i)

(2)

N®t is desired or equilibrium employment, and Nt adjusts according to equation (2); Qt
denotes current output. As N®t is unobserved, (1) is substituted into (2) to yield:
Nt - Nt-i = X m d - Nt-i)
Nt = A.f(Qt) + (1 - >.)Nt-i

(3a)
(3b)

The sluggish nature of adjustment is given by (1 - Xy^, Adjustment is instantaneous if
X =1. Note, however, that the model does not allow explicitly for a labour supply
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equation. This highlights a further advantage of Chow's (1983) generalized technique.
Specifying a supply equation is desirable, especially in the long-run. The specification of
a supply function will be more apparent in Chapter 3.
Also the Chow (1983) technique of estimating markets in (dynamic)
disequilibrium was found to embrace optimal-adjustment paths (Griliches, 1967), labour
hoarding (where M captures the speed of adjustment) and Patinkin's (1956, 1965)
analysis. The implicit assumption of price and quantity adjustment during a
disequilibrium phase also avoids the use of the short-side trading rule, which was found
to have a number of shortcomings. The technique further avoids the specification of
effective supply and demand curves, and consequentiy the problems of making spillover
effects explicit.
To specify a model using effective labour supply and demand functions requires
reformulating a firm's production function and budget constraint so that the firm cannot
sell all the output it desires; firms are constrained in the output market. Difficulties in
selling output in the product market will spill over into the labour market as a reduction in
the demand for labour. Specifying these spillover effects becomes theoretically and
econometrically cumbersome; the form of the spillover is the subject of considerable
debate. For a rigorous discussion on spillover effects and estimation see Honkapohja
and Ito(1985).
In adopting the partial adjustment equation, it is assumed that M, the speed of
adjustment coefficient for wages and employment, is constant and is not influenced by
the direction or movement of the economy. This in turn implies symmetric adjustment
for both wages and employment by firms. Symmetric adjustment of labour by firms is
where the rate the firms adjustment of labour is the same for an economic upturn (hiring)
as it is for an economic downturn (lay-offs). Asymmetric adjustment, for example, is
where the rate of employment is adjusted more during an economic upturn than in a
downturn.
Assuming that the cost of adjusting labour is dependent on the state of the labour
market, the speed of adjusting labour by firms should vary over the business cycle. In

this procedure, however, M is a constant coefficient and, thus the estimated value that M
takes on will not change over the business cycle. In the case of an economic downturn,
firms experience increasing adjustment costs by laying off labour, then downward
adjustment of labour would slow down when unemployment is higher. This implies that
M, with respect to employment, should not be constant or that the speed of adjustment
need not be symmetric.
If labour recruitment and lay-offs are somehow a function of labour market
tightness, then the adjustment coefficient M should be made a function of such tightness
in the labour market; the unemployment rate, as cited in the literature on disequilibrium, is
a natural candidate to represent such tightness. Variation in unemployment, however,
may not capture such tightness if variation in unemployment is primarily due to changes
in \J% the natural rate of unemployment. As Chow (1983) points out, M can be made a
function of other variables and hence will no longer be a constant.
Hazeldine (1979), Briscoe and Peel (1975), Thomas and Deaton (1977), and
Muellbauer (1978) all suggest the presence of an asymmetric labour adjustment over the
business cycle. Earlier studies, such as Hawkins (1971) and Fair (1969), made their
adjustment coefficient (X in equation 2) a function of the unemployment rate in an attempt
to capture asymmetric adjustment of labour by firms (cited in Hazeldine, 1979).
Hazeldine (1979) remarks, however, that there is no clear evidence, especially for
Canadian manufacturing as a whole, of asymmetric labour adjustment. What is
important, however, is that the partial adjustment equation accounts for the apparent
contradiction of theory with observed reality. The form of Chow's (1983) partial
adjustment equation is the same as Griliche's (1967) and Brechling's (1965) partial
adjustment equation for employment. Chow's (1983) is a generalized partial adjustment
equation; this becomes more apparent by expanding the endogenous vectors Yt and Y®t
for a labour market:
Nt - Nt-i = biiWt - Nt-i)
(4a)
Wt - Wt-i = ai(Wet - Wt-i)
(4b)

Since both endogenous variables as dictated by equation 10 in the previous section are
allowed to adjust during the disequilibrium phase, (4) becomes:
Nt - Nt-i = biCN^t - Nt-i) + b2(Wet-Wt.i)
(5a)
Wt - Wt-i = aiCW^t- Wt-i) + a a m - Nt-i)
(5b)
The coefficient M implies symmetric adjustment of the real wage; if the real wage
is rigid downwards then this is an inappropriate assumption. The Patinkin (1956,1965)
analysis, however, allows for a downward adjustment of the real wage; although
downward adjustment may well be slower than upward adjustment. The PAM equation,
and its implied assumption of symmetric adjustment, is thought to be theoretically
adequate, since it overcomes an inconsistency of theory with reality and there is no
overwhelming evidence of asymmetric labour adjustment for manufacturing as a whole.
From a Classical perspective Qt should be replaced with real wages Wt but as
Hazeldine (1979, pll) points out, "it seems to be just not possible to get good fits
without including a quantity demand variable" in the demand function. Indeed, this may
be a manifestation of disequilibrium, since in disequilibrium output becomes an explicit
variable that at least partly explains unemployment. Symons and Layard (1984, p788)
suggest that "if product markets are competitive and firms operate on their demand
curves, employment should be explained by real factor prices (relative to product prices),
the capital stock and the state of technology". With classical assumptions, output would
not enter the labour demand function explicitly while real wages would. Output in the
product market, in other words, is never constrained, in that firms can sell as much as
they produce. Within a (New)Keynesian framework, however, firms may not operate on
their labour demand curve; they may be quantity- constrained. Thus, in following
Patinkin (1956, 1965), output also becomes an explicit variable. A long-run labour
demand function (where wages are not fixed) will have as explicit variables, both output
and real wages. Briefly, with (New)Keynesian theory, unlike Neo-Classical, less than
full employment will occur without institutional rigidities.
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that within a Walrasian framework NeoClassical and Neo-Keynesian doctrines are very similar; in particular there is no clear

distinction between the theories if wages are allowed to be flexible. Indeed, within the
(New)Keynesian theory a reduction in the real wage does not necessarily cure
involuntary unemployment, but it does in a Walrasian framework; (i.e. both Neoclassical and Neo-Keynesian). The superficial distinction between Neo-Classical and
Neo-Keynesian theories has been maintained by making the assumption, among others,
of rigid money wages. Indeed this assumption can also be perceived as Neo-Classical in
character. Using Chow's (1983) disequilibrium procedure to estimate Neo-Keynesian
unemployment would be inappropriate, because the wage rate, an endogenous variable,
is assumed to be rigid.
A disequilibrium framework, and hence Chow's (1983) procedure, embraces
both (New)Keynesian and Neo-Classical theories. Importantly, within a dynamic
disequilibrium framework, where wages are endogenous and therefore considered
flexible, a distinction between Neo-Classical and (New)Keynesian theories still emerges.
Since both theories (as argued here) are a manifestation of disequilibrium they can be
placed on a continuum where both prices and quantities adjust to equilibrium, particularly
in the long run. At one extreme where quantities (labour) may adjust more rapidly than
prices (wages) we have a (New)Keynesian phenomenon. At the other end of the
continuum where prices react more rapidly than quantities, we have a Neo-Classical
scenario. The paper now turns to specifying and estimating an unemployment model
using Chow's (1983) generalized partial adjustment technique.

CHAPTER 3

THE MODEL: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS
3.1

THE MODEL SPFrTFTFD
The model presented below revolves around five equations. Equation (5), which

is Chow's (1983) generalized model, has been extensively developed in previous
sections. The unemployment equation (1) is placed in a system of equations because
wages are assumed to be endogenous. Involuntary unemployment stems from a labour
market in disequilibrium; hence N®t and W®t are assumed unobservable in equations (3)
and (4), which together comprise the labour market. Equation (3) provides the link
between the labour market and unemployment. The assumption is that W®t will influence
Wt, but not to the extent where W®t = Wt. Otherwise N% from a Classical perspective,
will be observable and unemployment will be all voluntary.

1:

The unemployment equation
Ut = u(Wt,Qt,St,Tt) + Et

2:

The wage equation
Wt = w(AWt, W S Ft, Ut, Bt) + Et

3:

The labour demand function
Net = d(Wet,Qt,Kt) + Et

4:

The labour supply equation
N^t = sCW^t, Lt, Ut) + Et

5:

The system is closed bv
Yt-Yt-i = M(Yet-Yt.i),
where

Kt

=

Capital stock.

Pt

=

C.P.I. (100 = 80/81.)

W®t

=

Unobserved equilibrium real wage.

Wt

=

Observed (actual) disequilibrium real wage.

Ut

=

Observed unemployment - persons (000s).

Nt

=

Estimated disequilibrium employment (000s).

N®t

=

Unobserved equilibrium employment.

Qt

=

Observed real output (G.D.P. $mill., 1979/80 - average prices).

Bt

=

Real unemployment benefits (single adult male without dependents,
deflated by Pt, 100 = 80/81)

St

=

Search unemployment variable. Defined as

Tt

=

Demand dispersion/structural unemployment variable.

Lt

=

Labour Force, persons aged 15 years and over.

AWt

=

Real award wage index. Deflated by Pt, 100 = 80/81.

Et

=

Error terms with Normal Classical assumptions.

BJ/WL

The above model was estimated over two time periods to provide a comparison
between these two periods. Period I (PI) is the first quarter of 1964(1) to the third
quarter of 1972(3). Period II (PII) covers the fourth quarter of 1972(4) to the second
quarter in 1986(2). The decision to end the first period at 1972(3) is based on the fact
that the classifications of industries changed in 1972(4). Consequently, since the variable
Tt requires employment statistics from various industries, the index Tt was constructed
over the two separate periods as mentioned above. This is not unfortunate, because
unemployment became more volatile after the early 1970s. An introductory discussion of
each equation for both periods is presented below.

3.1.1

The Unemplnvmpni Equation: Ut = u(Wt,Qt, St, Tt) + Et.
The equation, while of a simpler form, is in keeping with Trivedi and Baker

(1982, 1985). St is the ratio of Bt and Wt: the higher the ratio the larger will be the

number of persons searching for work. Then a priori, the sign on St may be expected to
alter between periods.
Friedman's model of ftictional unemployment incorrecúy predicts that the quit rate
falls during a boom and rises during a recession (Kennedy, 1979). A job search scenario
becomes more credible if, in the short-run, job search activity tends to rise when
unemployment is low. This is depicted in Diagram 3.1, where Ut and SAt denote the
unemployment rate and search activity respectively, and SU is the search-unemployment
curve which embodies the inverse relationship between SAt and Ut. The inverse
relationship is consistent with the concept of full employment-unemployment. That is,
search unemployment is a constraint upon achieving 100% employment. The a priori
sign on SAt, however, needs careful consideration. While there exists a negative
relationship between Ut and St, there is a positive relationship between St and SAt.
Consequently, there exists a negative relationship between St (which is the cost of SAt)
and Ut. Assuming that Bt has declined (relative to Wt), which most certainly occurred
during the first period, then the coefficient on St may have a positive sign. However, if
Bt has risen (relative to Wt), which is thought to be the situation in the second period,
then St may yield a negative sign.
More will be said about Bt in relation to the wage equation, but for the moment a
reversal of signs on St will be assumed to indicate a change in search behaviour. A
positive sign (expected) on PI suggests that SAt is at or close to its irreducible minimum
(since Bt is expected to be small or insignificant relative to Wt). A negative St (expected)
in Pn will suggest an increase in search activity.
Traditionally, search unemployment is considered as non-demand deficient
unemployment^. The other non-demand deficient unemployment considered is structural
unemployment; specified as Tt. The Tt index is constructed from the following formulae:
D
Tt = Z INit - Ntl (W)
Ñt =
Ñit
.NtJ
^^"iNt,
i=l
This is not strictly true. All types of unemployment are affected by demand factors.

Diagram 3.1
Search-IJnemnlnvment

Curve

SAt

SU

1^
1
!

SU
Ui

Ui
SAt
SU

Unemployment rate
Search Activity
Search-Unemployment curve. That is, there is an inverse relationship
between SAt and Ui.

and the subscript t denotes current time period. Nt is total employment in D industries
—jr
and Nit is employment in industry i. The dot refers to the rate of change, while N t
denotes the weighted average rate of change of employment for all industries. As
Stoikov (1966, p54) says the index (TO "is a measure of demand dispersion that occurs
from [time period to time period]. If there were not relative shifts in demand for labour
between industries then individual deviations from the all-industry average rate of change
of employment would be zero. The greater the relative shifts of demand the larger the
index. The individual deviations [of labour demand] from the average rate of change are
weighted by the relative employment of the industry in question in order to take account
of industries with different employment volumes".
The index attempts to capture a mismatch in labour skills demanded and supplied.
In Australia, where there exist distinct segmented labour markets, changes in the cyclical
demand for labour will lead to a divergence in the supply and demand of labour skills.
This assumes that there exists:
i)

costly and imperfect labour mobility between industries and geographic
regions;

ii)

changes in the composition of consumer demand and technology
(manifested as a change in the nature of capital), and hence also in the
composition of production; and

iii)

regional shifts of both industry and labour (i.e. in both labour supply and
demand).

Technology has been singled out as the underlying cause of the divergence
between the demand for and supply of labour skills. In the short-run, holding all other
factors constant, the adoption of new technology may lead to a mismatch of labour skills
demanded and supplied. In the long-run, however, if the economy is expanding and
efficient in adjusting resources quickly when supply and demand shifts, then it is less
certain that a divergence between labour skills demanded and supplied will cause
persistent unemployment Specifically, whether Tt shows up as a significant explanation
of Ut will depend on the output and substitution effects of replacing labour with capital;

in the short-run and for a particular industry the adoption of labour-saving capital will
reduce employment, assuming that output has not risen to compensate for the substitution
effect of labour for capital. Perhaps for the economy as a whole and in the long-run the
assumption of constant output is not valid; indeed the adoption of capital raises the
productivity of those employed, thus providing a stronger demand for labour in an
expanding economy. More will be said about structural unemployment in reference to Kt
in the labour demand equation. For the moment, however, the expected sign on Tt in the
unemployment equation is negative in both periods.
The variables Wt and Qt enter the equation as arguments, since it has been
demonstrated that Ut is partly a disequilibrium phenomenon. The variables in themselves
are not sufficient to distinguish between (New)Keynesian and Neo-Classical
unemployment, either from a theoretical or from a statistical point of view.
Multicollinearity will not bias the estimates, but it will lead to an increase in the variances
of the estimates; Wt and Qt are included for theoretical completeness. The a priori signs
on Wt and Qt are positive and negative respectively.

To allow for the long-run

endogeneity of Wt the unemployment equation is placed in a system of equations.

3.1.2

The Wage Equation: Wt = w(AWt, W ^ , Pt, Ut, Bt) + Et
The (disequilibrium) wage equation provides the link between the

unemployment equation and the labour market via the unobserved explanatory variable
W^f This variable is a measure of labour market tightness, but its sign and significance
is difficult to predict in relation to the disequilibrium wage (Wt). (Detailed discussion of
this variable is left to Section 4.2.) The remaining arguments of this equation are
addressed in the following discussion; what will evolve from the ensuing discussion is
the expected sign on the other variables (Pt, Ut, Bt, AWt).
Traditionally, during the upturn of a trade cycle price levels increase (Pt) and
unemployment levels (Ut) fall. If these variables enter the wage equation as follows;

Wt = f(Pt,Ut) where ^

> 0 and

< 0

then Wt would exhibit pro-cyclical behaviour with the trade cycle, which is consistent
with Patinkin's (1956, 1965) disequilibrium analysis of the labour market. A low or
declining Ut reflects a tight labour market which may explain the pro-cyclical nature of
Wt. Union activity too, may facilitate this behaviour.
Conversely, if Pt and Ut enter the wage equation as:
^aw < 0. and, aw > ^.
then Wt will not move pro-cyclically with the trade cycle. This behaviour of Wt is
consistent with a Walrasian/Classical model of the labour market. As output expands the
resultant rise in Pt will lower Wt (and hence raise the demand for labour and lower the
supply of labour). Briefly, during the upturn of a trade cycle Pt may be rising (and Ut
declining) while real wages (Wt) are declining. The implication for unions is that they:
i)
suffer from money illusion if price increases are imperceptible; or
ii) accept a real wage reduction in return for job security and high levels of
employment. That is, money illusion is forced upon unions. In terms of wage
claims unions therefore may well be passive.
If Pt and Ut enter with identical signs then the traditional relationship between
these variables may no longer exist. The two possibilities are:
or

aw

n

^ .

The implication is that a positive relationship between Ut and Pt exists, as opposed to the
traditional inverse relationship; the traditional relationship between Pt and Ut suggests a
stable Phillips Curve.^ When Pt and Ut are of identical signs then either:
i)
the Phillips Curve is unstable; or,
Irealizethat the original Phillips Curve has on its vertical axis the rate of increase in money
wages. The aim of this paper is not to analyse the Phillips Curve, but the implication is there.

ii)

a short-run Phillips Curve relationship does not exist unless defined in
terms of money wages.
Positive signs suggest a positive (or pro-cyclical) relationship with Wt. When the signs
on Pt and Ut are negative this suggests an inverse relationship with Wt; for instance, if Pt
(and Ut) are rising there is a reduction in real wages (Wt). This relationship between Pt
and Wt implies that union activity with respect to real wages may be a function of Ut, so
that rising unemployment levels (Ut) are sufficient to dampen union activity. On the
other hand if Pt (and Ut) are positive then real wages move pro-cyclically and are rising
or at least being maintained or rising.
Taking the analysis a little further, for actual real wages to at least equal the
equilibrium real wage (W®t), there would be no lags in adjustment of money wages to a
price change. Otherwise real wages will be suppressed below W% even though both
prices and real wages are rising over time. For example, if the economy is initially in
equilibrium at position E in diagram 3.2, which designates full employment with real
wo
wages initially denoted by -P^, an increase in aggregate demand increases prices from Pq
to PI. This lowers the real wage to ^ (Step la). At ^ there is excess demand for
labour (given by OLi - OL2); this in turn will probably raise money wages from W^ to
Wl. However, if inflation is validated then Pi will rise to P2, keeping the actual real
wage below E (step 2).
If money wages, however, adjust instantaneously to the price rise (Step lb) then
Wt = W®t. If money wages rise faster than Pt then real wages will rise, possibly above
point E. If there were no lagged response of money wages then the current value of Pt
may be expected to be positive and significant. The Arbitration Commission's decisions
will play a role in determining the value of Pt in relation to Wt. If a change in award
wages (AWt) is equal to P1-P2 then real wages will be maintained. Indeed, real wages
may lie above W^t. A positive W^t suggests that the market is exerting an influence; in a

Diagram 3.2
A Labour Market:

Real Wages Sunnressed

Real
Wage (AV/P)

lb
r

wo/Po = w i / P i

la

Wo/Pi =Wi/P2
'
T

Labour

Note:

To illustrate the reverse of Patinkin's (1956, 1965) analysis where there is
excessive production and hence over-full employment requires a
movement to point B. However, to show also the co-existence of a real
wage underhang is unduly awkward within this framework. This diagram
is presented as it more clearly illustrates how actual real wages may remain
below equilibrium values. This analysis is a preparation to understanding
Keynes' theory of inflation which is presented in Section 4.3.

dynamic model, a changing W®t will drag Wt with it if the market is exerting an
influence.
Moreover, during Period II Australia experienced wage indexation from 1975 to
1981 and again in 1983. Perry (1983), cited in Veale et. al. (1983), states that although
the arbitration system may have been a rubber stamp in terms of ratifying collective
bargaining agreements outside the arbitration system, this ratification of awards flowed
on quite rapidly to increase other minimum award wages. Indeed, "from 1971 to 1975
the increase in award wages was much greater than the rate of productivity growth
(usually between 2 and 3 per cent per year) combined with the rate of growth of prices;
[these] two variables are the usual grounds for an increase in award wages...In real terms
award wages grew by an unprecedented 13.85 per cent in 1974. It is difficult to explain
such increases in terms of demand-pull" (Ibid, p 137-38). Moreover, according to
Mitchell (1985, p7), "if the return to wage indexation in 1983 has again locked in the
previous effects of the 1981-82 wage explosion then ...the associated level of
unemployment could well be locked in by the same mechanisms that were used in the
1970's".
In Period I, a priori, the relationship between Wt and Ut should be significant and
as suspected may be insignificant in Period n. In Period II, as discussed, Wt may well
be determined by factors other than supply and demand for labour, such as award wage
(AWt) decisions in line with rises in the price level, Pt. It is thought that union
aggressiveness in terms of real wage maintenance is another factor in explaining the
relationship between Wt, AWt, Pt and Ut. The sign on Ut is difficult to predict in period
II. If institutional factors interupt the link between Wt and Ut, then the relationship
between these two variables may prove to be insignificant. In Period I, with smaller
price movements, unions were perhaps less concerned with maintaining the real wage.
Finally, Pt is assumed to be exogenous because Cronin (1984), citing a number
of macroeconomic studies, states that prices are not very sensitive to demand conditions.
Price insensitivity is also consistent with oligopoly theory. On the other hand the

exogeneity of the level of real unemployment benefits (BO is less certain. Briefly, it may
be that an increase in the level of Bt raises the reservation wage of the unemployed. The
expected sign on Bt (assuming that Bt leads to Wt) will be positive. This may have
occured in PII. The implication is that the rise in the level of Bt will cause a rise in St,
indirectly Ut = f(Bt); however it is also reasonable to assume that Bt = f(Ut). The rising
numbers of the unemployed lead, via political activity, to a rise in the level of Bt. It is
important to note, however, that Bt lies in the wage equation, which will help to
determine the direction of causation. If the coefficient on Bt is positive (and significant)
then actual Wt is raised because of a rise in the reservation wage. If the coefficient on Bt
is negative, which may be expected to occur in PI because Bt changed very littie during
the 1960s, then Wt will fall. Consequentiy, the sign (and significance) of Bt may
provide a simple test of causation.
Summarizing, if one supposes that the Arbitration Commission and unions
dominated the wage-determination process, (especially in PII), then the coefficient on Pt
and AWt may be expected to be positive and significant, perhaps over-shadowing the
impact of W®t. In PI there may have been over-full employment, and current price levels
(Pt) may not have been a significant explanatory factor in determining Wt. This implies a
lagged response of money wages to current price changes. In PI the Arbitration
Commission may have imposed a lagged response, while in PII the institutional setting
was such as to remove a lagged response of money wages to Pt- Unions too, in PI, may
have been passive, as previously discussed, so that a lagged adjustment of money wages
was probably not union induced.

3.1.3

The Labour Demand Function: N ^ = diW^t, Qt, Kt) + Et
The demand equation follows Rosen and Quandt (1978), except that capital stock

(Kt) figures were generated^ and used instead of the simple time proxy. Time captures

See data source pp.118-19 for construction.

all factors rather than capital specifically. Rosen's and Quandt's (1978) demand function
is derived from a profit maximization assumption. Thus, the firm will maximize profit
given disequilibrium values, along the lines of Patinkin's (1956, 1965) analysis. Given
disequilibrium values, the objective of the firm is to maximize profits, although actual
maximized profit within disequilibrium will be lower than the level of maximized profits
at traditional static equilibrium. The sign on Kt is again difficult to determine a priori. Its
inclusion is relevant in a long-run analysis, for in the long-run the firm has the
opportunity to change factor combinations of Kt and labour (Nt).
It would be strongly suspected that the coefficient on Kt will be positive, if a
change in Kt (both in quantity and nature) is labour-augmenting.

Given stable

participation rates the sign on Tt in the unemployment equation may be negative (and
insignificant) to be consistent with a positive Kt in the employment equation. This
implies little or no labour displacement when firms adopt capital, and hence little change
in structural unemployment. If the acquisition of capital displaces labour, and output
does not rise to compensate the decrease in employment, then Kt will be negative.
Presumably, the displaced workers no longer have the appropriate skills, and therefore
may be considered to be structurally unemployed; Tt in the unemployment equation
would be positive. In short, the signs must be opposite to be consistent. If Kt and Tt
exhibit the same sign then this would be difficult to explain.
The coefficient on Kt is expected, however, to be positive. Firstly, Kt and Nt
will in part be complements as there is little displacement of labour. Some additional
labour skills will be required to operate new capital. If new capital requires new skills
(because of the adoption of new technology), then the complementary effect is stronger in
the long-run when workers have time to acquire the new skills demanded. This line of
reasoning is echoed by Hamermesh and Rees (1984). Moreover, adopting new capital
may increase labour productivity, thus potentially raising the demand for labour; or
prices may be lowered, thus increasing real wages and providing an impetus for
expanding output which may offset the displacement or substitution effect of capital.

Layard and Nickell (1985), discredit a number of scenarios suggesting that a
changing Kt (i.e. adopting new technology) is a significant source of rising
unemployment. This adds credibility to the a priori reasoning that the coefficient on Kt
should be positive. They argue, given that if human wants are satiated (or effective
demand cannot increase), then increased productivity means the displacement of labour
(i.e. the substitution effect of labour when acquiring Kt is greater than the output effect).
Layard and Nickell (1985) point out that there is no evidence of satiation. Another
argument which implies that Kt may be negative, is that the namre of capital is such, that
when fully utilized, the generated output is insufficient to employ the whole labour
supply. This, according to Layard and Nickell (1985), was argued by Malinvaud
(1982). For this to have any explanatory power for Australia, the labour productivity of
those employed would have to have risen significantly faster in Pn, when unemployment
started to rise rapidly. This has not occurred, according to Indecs (1986, p73). "Prior to
the 1974 world-wide recession, the rate of growth of Australian productivity [measured
as output per person] on this basis had averaged between 2.5 and 3.0 per cent per annum
depending on the time period measured. Since 1974 there has been a distinctly slower
trend [in] productivity growth. Over the last decade [1974-85] non-farm productivity
growth averaged 1.7 per cent per annum." Moreover, according to Layard and Nickell
(1985, p81) "productivity growth in the United Kingdom fell when unemployment rose".
This implies that output had fallen. Briefly, I expect on strong a priori reasoning that the
coefficient on Kt should take on a positive sign. To be consistent, the coefficient on Tt
is expected to be insignificant and negative. The signs of the other variables are now
discussed.
In respect to real wages and output a long controversy exists over the specification
of the demand for labour function. The demand function here may be viewed as a hybrid
of Classical and Neo-Keynesian theories. From a Classical perspective only real wages
would enter the function, while only output would be explicit from a Neo-Keynesian
perspective. Within a disequilibrium framework both the real wage and output should
enter the labour demand function. The relative speed of adjustment toward equilibrium

may distinguish between Neo-Classical and (New)Keynesian unemployment. The
output variable captures changes in product demand; output affects Nt either through
factor substitution or, assuming competitive conditions, the quantity of production which
the firm desires to supply. An objection (from a Neo-Classical point of view) is that only
the price of factors should enter the demand equation (i.e. real wages and the price of
capital). If the economy is Classical in the sense that economic agents are price-takers
then the objection would be valid. Firms would choose their output rate to maximize
profits at a given set of prices; output itself is a function of prices and would not appear
as an exogenous argument. The theme of this thesis, however, is that the economy does
not in fact correspond to Classical assumptions. Thus from a dynamic disequilibrium
perspective, as pointed out in theoretical sections, both real wages and the quantity of
output are explicit arguments. Moreover, as Hazeldine (1979, pi 1) suggests, it does not
appear possible to get good fits without including output as a quantity variable in the
demand function.
For completeness of the discussion, the assumption behind factor substitution is
cost minimisation. In dealing with factor substitution the appropriate variable to consider
is the price of capital relative to the price of labour. The true price of capital, however, is
difficult to determine and beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, Hazeldine (1979,
pl3) again points out that "such a variable does not always work econometrically".
Consequentiy, I proceed by specifying output and Kt as quantities. The expected sign
on output is positive, and negative for the real wage.

3.1.4

The I.ahour Supply Function: N ^ = SiW^t, Lt, Ut) + Et.
The labour force variable

is included as a long-run exogenous argument.

The a priori sign is positive in both periods, since an increase in the number of persons
aged 15 years and over increases the potential labour supply. The inclusion of real wages
is based on tiie theory of leisure-income choice, whilst the inclusion of the Ut variable is
consistent with disequilibrium theory.

A positive sign on real wages would be consistent with the traditional pro-cyclical
nature of the participation rate. The expected sign on Ut needs careful consideration.
Ham (1986) points out that underlying this type of labour supply curve (i.e. where Ut is
an argument) are a number of (New)Keynesian disequilibrium models, one of which is
the Barro and Grossman (1971) model.'^ If workers are off their supply curves then, as
Ham (1986) discloses, Ut will be a significant systematic variable. If the sign on Ut, for
example, is negative then workers will be off their supply curves, and this will indicate
involuntary unemployment. Briefly, if a significant part of Ut is involuntary then a
decrease in Ut will constitute an increase in employment (Nt); if vacancies rise, the extra
vacancies will be filled (i.e. engaged in employment) thus decreasing Ut- This of course
stands in stark contrast to the Lucas and Rapping (1969) continuous equilibrium model.
If Ut is significant then this will indicate that workers are off their supply curves, and the
Lucas and Rapping (1969) model will not be supported. If there is a positive coefficient
on Ut, this will indicate that workers are on their supply curves, but now unemployment
may be viewed as voluntary; this may have occurred in PI.

3.2

H F N F R A r COMMENTS
It should be pointed out that St + Tt in a disequilibrium framework is not

synonymous with the natural rate of unemployment (NRU); only in equilibrium does St
+ Tt = NRU. In a disequilibrium framework the variables St + Tt may define NAIRU,
where NRU may be thought of as a special or unique case of NAIRU. Constant inflation
is defined as Pt = P*t. but since price expectations (P*t) are not explicit in this model
there is no guarantee that NAIRU is given by St + Tt in a disequiUbrium phase.
A further point to note is that Wt and Qt in the unemployment equation are not
sufficient to distinguish between Neo-Classical and (New)Keynesian scenarios. A major
problem is the probability of multicollinearity between these two variables, but together
they explain demand-side unemployment. The relative speeds with which Nt and Wt
adjust toward equilibrium will determine which scenario operates. "In a pure Wakasian
This model, in particular Patinkin (1956, 1965) has been discussed in section 2.3.

world adjustment back to market-clearing equilibrium is achieved by means of
[instantaneous] price adjustment. In a pure [New]Keynesian world there is no price
adjustment - only quantities adjust as trading occurs at non-market-clearing prices",
(Levac'ic and Rebmann, 1988, p308).
Relative speeds of adjustment are to be measured by the partial adjustment
equation for employment and real wages as developed in section 2.5. The partial
adjustment of each endogenous variable will take the following form:
Nt - Nt-i = biCN^t - Nt-i) + b2(Wet - Wt-i)
Wt - Wt-i = aiCW^t - Wt-i) + a2(Net - Nm)

(5a)
(5b)

The variables W®t and N®t are unobserved notional variables which can be estimated by
applying Chow's (1983) estimation procedure. These notional variables can now be
used to estimate, after re-arrangement, equations (5a) and (5b). The algebra is presented
for (5a), but it is the same for (5b). Solving for Nt gives:
Nt = biNet+ (l-b2)Nt-i+ bsW^- b4Wt.i.
As this point estimation may take place, but a theoretical problem exists. Firstly, N®t and
W®t are simultaneously determined. Therefore N^t (and W^t) should be the dependent
variable. Moreover, b2 only gives the speed of adjustment of one disequilibrium value to
another, not the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium. While the coefficient bi
provides only the degree of disequilibrium, rearranging and solving for N^t (and W^O
will allow for simultaneous estimation and a coefficient which will give the speed of
adjustment toward equilibrium. Hence,
N^t = (-brl)(l-b2)Nt.i + (-brl)b3Wet - (-brl)b4Wt-i - (-brl)Nt.

Regressing by using 2SLS (which in this case amounts to indirect least squares), the
wage and employment equation will give estimates of:
(-brl)bis , (-brl)(l-b2) and bi-l , where bi =
The estimates for both equations are:
N^t = b3Wet+ (l-b2)Nt.i - b4Wt.i + br^ Nt
W^t = asN^t + (l-a2)Wt.i + a4Nt.i + ar^ Wt

(6a)
(6b)

Subsequently, a comparison of b2 and a2 will indicate the relative speeds of adjustment
toward equilibrium; speed is defined as
where AT equals per unit time. If
for example b2 = 1, adjustment is instantaneous; if b2 = 0 there is complete inertia. The
coefficients (l-b2 and l-a2) are desirable because, as Bowden (1978) points out, they set
the limits of adjustment between 0 and 1. Otherwise instantaneous adjustment is given
by bi = infinity, in other words the value that bi takes on is not bounded. I now turn to
the estimation of N®t and W®t.

CHAPTER 4

THE RESULTS
4.1 t h e R E P U C E P - F O R M

EQUATIONS

Estimates of reduced equations of the form Yt = ZiXt + Z2Yt-i + e are presented
below for both periods. ^ Estimating the reduced-form equations, using quarterly data, is
the first step in generating Y®t. The results of applying OLS to the reduced-form
equations are presented on the following page.
The Chow (1983) procedure dictates the specification of the above equations.
Insignificant variables therefore may not be eliminated from the equations. There is also
difficulty in assessing the explanatory variables on a priori economic grounds. It may,
however, be pointed out that the a priori signs on the lagged variables are correct except
for the variables Nt-i (in equation IIW) and Wt-i (in equation IN). Statistically 11 of the
24 explanatory variables (excluding the constant) are statistically significant (while Kt and
Qt in equation EN are easily significant at a lesser level of confidence), and the R^, F
and the Durban-Watson (D.W) statistics are all satisfactory. Only equation Ir that was
corrected for auto-correlation, using the Cochrane-Orcutt method, is equation IN.
According to many econometricians, e.g. Thompson (1985), lagged dependent
variables render the D.W. test invalid (i.e. D.W. is biased towards 2.) On the other
hand, according to Koutsoyiannis (1977, p309) this has "alarmed econometricians
unduly", as the alternative h-test is not without its limitations. The test is inappropriate if
nv(bi) > 1.2 According to Koutsoyiannis (1981), Malinvaud (1966) found that the bias
Where Zj =

h =

(I-M)

Z2 =

(-BA-^M)

e =

MA-^E and

( l - ^ ^ ) Vn/l-nv(bi)

D.W = Duibin Watson statistic
n = sample size

K,
Xt = U
Ut
VOrV
where

and Y,
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Standard errors are presented in parenthesis

(0.012)

DW

F
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0.93
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- UN

in the D.W statistic will decline if other variables apart from the lagged dependent
variables are used as explanatory variables. Taylor and Wilson (1964), using an
amended form of the D.W test (i.e. rejecting the null hypothesis if D.W < dL and
accepting if D.W > du), tested for the presence of serial correlation in O.L.S. regression
with lagged dependent variables. They found that the D.W test performs well:
i)
the larger the size of the sample,
ii) the larger the R^, and
iii) the larger the absolute value of the coefficient on the lagged dependent
variable.
The sample size for Period I is 35 and 55 for Period II. The lowest 'R^ is 0.87
and generally, (except for equation IN) the value of the lagged dependent coefficient
relative to other variables in the respective equations appear not to be too small. There
appears to be little to choose between the D.W and h-tests. Consequently, on the basis
of the D.W statistic, it is concluded that there is no significant serial correlation.
According to Leobo (1976, p499) "a rule of thumb...[in practice]...is, if the D.W statistic
is between 1.5 and 2.5 serial correlation is not significant." The D.W statistics of all
equations are within this range; the D.W for equations IW and UN are 2.05 and 1.90
respectively, which are not significantly different from 2. It is perhaps surprising that
only one equation warranted correction for serial correlation. Thompson (1985) explains
that, if the presence of serial correlation initially exists in the data, then the introduction of
a lagged dependent variable will remove it.
Briefly, the four equations are quite acceptable. Experimenting with log-linear
form and various lags did not, in an overall sense, improve the equations presented. In
Period I, lagging Nt and Wt (both linear and log-linear) more than one period (up to 4
periods i.e. one year) resulted in a decline in the number of significant variables.
Lagging Wt in equation IN more than one period rarely yielded a correct sign. When it
did, however, other lagged variables exhibited incorrect signs. The scenario is similar
for Period H. Lagging Nt more than one period (both linear and log linear) rarely yielded
a correct sign. As in Period I when the sign was correct, there was a loss in the number

of significant variables and other lagged variables yielded incorrect signs. Consequently,
the reduced-form equations presented here are used to generate Y®t via the equation:
Y^t = -BA-lXt where
-BA-1 = -BA-lM(M-l)
and M-l is derived from (I-M)^.
It may be noted that estimates of -BA-l using the Chow (1983) procedure are
consistent. Ordinarily, however, estimates of equations (such as the reduced equations)
that follow a geometric lag of the general form,
Yt = a i Xt + a2 Yt-i + et
yield both biased and inconsistent estimates of a i and a2. Thompson (1985) however,
points out that the presence of serial correlation alone does not lead to bias or inconsistent
estimates; a dependent variable alone leads to bias only but not inconsistency. It is the
combination of serial correlation and Yt-i that results in the OLS estimator being both
biased and inconsistent. Implicit in the error term (et) is a geometric lag structure where
the disturbance term is auto-correlated. The estimates a i and a2 will be biased and
inconsistent because there will be simultaneous correlation between et and Yt-i.
The partial adjustment equation (after appropriate substitution) also follows the
structure of a geometric lag, yet the estimates yielded remain consistent. This is due to
the nature of the partial adjustment equation. In essence the disturbance term is not autocorrelated"^.

Hence, the application of OLS to the reduced-form equations will generate

consistent estimates, but will remain biased because of the inclusion of Yt-i. Bias of
estimates, however, may be less severe as the reduced equations form the basis of
calculating the unobservable equilibrium values of the real wage and employment, from
which both the model and adjustment equations can be estimated. The paper now turns
to the adjustment equations.

3

Refer to section 2.5

^

See the Appendix for a more detailed discussion.

4.2

THE ADTIJSTMENT EOIJATTONS
Generating observations of Y®t makes possible the estimation of the adjustment

equations. Hopefully the equations will determine whether the economy is characterized
by Neo-Classical or (New)Keynesian unemployment.

Moreover, the adjustment

equation with respect to employment may also shed light on labour hoarding.
Consequently, adjustment equations of the form:

Net= (-brl)(l-b2)Nt.i + (-brl)b3Wet-(-brl)b4Wt-i-(-brl)Nt
W^t = (-ari)(l-a2)Wt.i + (-arl)a3Net - (-arl)a4Nt.i - (-arl)Wt

were estimated for both periods using 2SLS. Joint estimation is theoretically more
desirable than single equation estimation. Since the model is just identified, 2SLS is
equivalent to indirect least squares. Koutsoyiannis (1977, p251) suggests that the
problem of multicollinearity may be bypassed if a simultaneous estimation procedure is
applied. Calculation of ai^ and bi^ is derived as follows:

bi = -brHbO/bi-l and ai= -arHaO/arl where i = l , 3 , 4 .

Thompson (1985), notes that the property of consistency carries over to the resultant bi^
and ai^- The estimator will have large-sample properties only; a large sample is
considered to be 32 observations and greater. It is important to note that the size of a2
and b2 will show explicitiy the speed of adjustment of Wt and Nt respectively toward
equilibrium. Speed is defined as:
N^t - Nt-i/Tt - Tt-i, where T = time.
Since Tt - Tm is equal to unity, the coefficients of b2 and a2 will yield directly the speed
of adjustment toward equilibrium. The estimates of the adjustment equations for both
periods are presented below.
ADTIISTMENT EQUATIONS

ADJUSTMENT EOIJATTONS
Period I

bsW-t

MWM

l-b2Nt.i

bf^N,

c

DW

SER

(-bi-^)V

2.57

1.24
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0.572
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18.22 aa)

(1.00)
2.17
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V
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(15%)

+
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-1-
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0.022
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+

+
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(1%)
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C
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-99.05

1.84

2.74 (lb)
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(0.17)
a2=1.32

(0.16)

(26.55)
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(15%)

(0.017)
0.05
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(5%)
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(1%)

N^

b3W^

M^l-l

l-b2Nt-i

bf^N,

C

(-bf^)V
Standard
errors

8.61

-0.46

-0.23

0.265

2617.13

(2.11)
32.49

(1.29)
-1.74

(0.18)
b2=1.87
-h
(almost)
(10%)

(0.18)

(279.16)

(almost)
(5%)

(1%)

(-ai-^)ai^
Standard
errors
ai^
a priori sign
Period II

V

a priori sign

+

+

+

+

(1%)

(CO)

+

DW

SER

1.98 54.48 (Ha)
(CO)

+

w^

asN^t

l-a2Wt.i

a4Ni-i

ar^w,

C

DW

SER

(-ai-l)ai'^
Standard
errors

0.07

0.128

0.003

0.123

-177.23

1.48

3.34 (Hb)

(0.014)
0.57

(0.13)
a2=-.04

(0.006)
0.024

(0.12)

(40.68)

ai''
a priori sign

+

(1%)

+
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+

+
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C
= constant.
DW = Durban Watson statistic.
CO = Cochran-Orcutt corrective technique for serial correlation.
SER = Standard error of regression.
Significance levels are presented in parenthesis.

(1%)

Using the Cochrane-Orcutt prcx^edure, all equations except lib were corrected for
serial correlation. Correcting lib for auto-correlation reduced the value of the D.W
statistic; it was decided, therefore, not to correct this equation (lib) for auto-correlation.
The D.W of 1.48 just lies outside the range ±1.5 (Leabo, 1976) and the a priori signs are
most satisfactory. The a priori signs are based on the reasoning that both employment
and wages move pro-cyclically over the trade cycle. Based on this a priori reasoning the
equations, in general, are satisfactory. Only Wt-i in equation Ha and lib exhibited a more
orthodox relationship. Perhaps equation Ila did not warrant correction for autocorrelation since, prior to correction, the value of the D.W statistic was 1.63; however,
only the constant was statistically significant. In terms of statistical confidence, 9 out of
the 20 variables are significant at the 1% level of significance, and 2 variables are
significant at the 5% level. Finally, the SER appear to be satisfactorily low. On a priori
and statistical grounds the equations are satisfactory. I now turn to the interpretation of
the adjustment coefficients a2 and b2 of Chow's (1983) adjustment equations.
Chow's (1983) partial adjustment equation is easier to interpret if equation (10)
from section 2.4 is recast as,
Yt = MYet + (I-M) Yt-i.
If M equals I then the equation collapses to Yt = IY®t, which suggests that equilibrium
variables are observable, which in turn implies continuous equilibrium, and therefore
instantaneous adjustment. If M equals zero there is no adjustment (i.e. complete inertia),
since Yt = lYt-i. The current disequilibrium variables are equal to the previous period's
disequilibrium variables. In terms of the employment adjustment equations (la and lia),
the range from zero to unity will measure the degree of labour hoarding. If b2 = 1 there
is no lagged response by firms, and adjustment of their stock of labour (the actual
number of those employed) is instantaneous and therefore costiess. If b2 = 0 then the
labour stock is not adjusted by firms to changes in the level of economic activity: there is
complete inertia. Note, however, that firms may still adjust the flow of labour services
(i.e. they will employ overtime during upturns and under-utilize their stock of labour
during economic downturns). Finally, this paper did not constrain the coefficients a2

and b2 to lie between zero and unity. It was decided to estimate unconstrained values of
a2 and b2.
The coefficient a2 (= 1.32) suggests that in Period I wages did adjust toward
equilibrium within one time period; the speed of adjustment is instantaneous. The
coefficient b2 (= .83) in Period I suggests a speed of adjustment which is less than
instantaneous. In Period n the reverse occurred, that is, wages (based on the value of a2
= -0.04) did not adjust at all towards equilibrium, while labour adjusted instantaneously
towards equilibrium (b2 = 1.87). The value of b2 in Period n appears to be too high
since it suggests that the adjustment of labour by firms is cosdess. A summary table is
presented below:
Table 4.1
Adjustment Coefficients
Wage
Employment
adjustment adjustment
(a2)

(b2)

Periodi

1.32

.83(.54)

NC b2 < a2

Period n

-0.04

1.87

NK b2 > a2

On the surface it appears that a Neo-Classical (NC) scenario was operative in Period I,
since wages adjust faster toward equilibrium than employment (b2 < a2), and a
(New)Keynesian (NK) scenario is operative in Period H, because employment adjusts
faster toward equilibrium than wages (b2 > a2). If this assessment is correct, then real
wages will enter the structural equations of the model as a significant explanation of
employment and unemployment in Period I, while in Period II output may enter the
model as the most important variable. Analysis of the model is left to the next section.
The size of a2 in Period II appears to suggest that the labour market has little to do
with determining the actual level of wages, since Wt does not adjust toward W®t. It is

expected, therefore, that the mcxiel that follows will indicate other factors, rather than the
equilibrium wage, that will determine the actual real wage. In Period I, where a2 =1.32,
the implication is that the labour market (and hence W^O plays a significant role in
explaining actual real wages. One may expect W®t to be significant in the wage equation
for Period I. As a consequence, the structural equations of the model should also supply
evidence of voluntary unemployment.

Moreover, since a2 in Period I implies

instantaneous adjustment, then the actual wage should equal, approximately, the
equilibrium wage. Indeed, a value for W®t of $202.86 is approximately equal to the
average value for Wt of $194.95.
Comparison of b2 across both periods offers some interesting interpretations
conceming firms' behaviour in respect to the adjustment of their labour stock. Clearly, in
Period II labour stock has become more sensitive to changes in economic activity
(output). There is evidence of labour dis-hoarding, which further indicates that
businesses in Period 11 have become less optimistic conceming recovery after an
economic downturn. The change in the behaviour of firms across the two periods, with
respect to labour dis-hoarding in Period 11, is consistent with Mangan (1981).
Consequentiy, it is expected that variations in output will explain less of the variation in
employment and unemployment in Period I than in Period H. A value of .83 for b2 in
Period I, which is less than unity, implies some degree of labour hoarding, but is too
high to conclude significant levels of labour hoarding. An alternative value of 0.54 for b2
in Period I does suggest significant degrees of labour hoarding. This alternative value
was calculated from equation la before it was corrected for autocorrelation.
Measuring employment (NO as man-hours instead of the number employed,
(from which relative speeds of labour hours employed and real wages may be
determined), may have yielded different results, but data constraints meant that stock
measures were used to capture the demand for labour. It is not altogether unfortunate,
however, as it has highlighted a change in business behaviour. Essentially, businesses in
Period n, have adjusted their stock of labour more readily to variations in output than in
Period I.

Finally, brief mention should be made of the model's stability. A definition of
dynamic stability is provided by Kmenta (1971, p592-3), where "in general...a system is
stable if, in a situation where the values of the exogoneous variables are held constant
through time, the mean values of the endogenous variables(s) settie down to some
constant level...The system is considered unstable if, for constant values of the
exogenous variables, the mean values of the endogenous variables either explode or
display a regular oscillatory movement". Diagram 4.1 illustrates both a stable and an
unstable model.
Part (a) illustrates a stable cobweb model. The dampened oscillatory pattern of
the endogenous variables over time for a stable cobweb are depicted in parts (ai) and (aii).
An unstable model, where the endogenous variables oscillate in a constant or explosive
manner, is depicted in parts (b) and (c) respectively. Part (d) illustrates a stable model
where exogenous variables are not constant. That is, either supply and demand curves in
the cobweb model shift over time, thus changing the equilibrium position through time
from ei to e2 to es. Notice tiiat equilibrium positions may change before actual values
equal equilibrium values, so that I assume disequilibrium to be the rule, rather than the
exception. A positive sign on W®t in the wage equations is consistent with a stable model
where equilibrium positions change, since Wt will follow W®t.
Following Rao (1983), eigenvalues are computed as a test for stability.
According to Chow (1983, pl47) when eigenvalues are less than unity in absolute values
a model is said to be stable.^ The eigenvalues calculated from the adjustment equations
for Period I are 0.267 and 0.191, and for Period H 0.427 and 0.067, which are all less
than one.
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In reference to a single-equation see Kmenta (1971, p593). In reference to multi-equations
(matrices) see Gandolfo (1971,1980,1981) and Griliches and Intrilligator (1983).
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4.3

THE STRUCTURAL EOIJATTONS:

A DTSCUSSTON

The regression results for both periods are presented below. The 2SLS procedure
was used to minimize simultaneous bias and, except for equation (IW), the correction for
serial correlation using the Cochrane-Orcutt technique was warranted. Again the S.E.R.
are satisfactorily low.

Period IT
It was demonstrated in the previous section that in Period 11 businesses more
readily adjusted their labour stock to variations in output (Qt). Therefore, output (Qt) is
expected to be significant relative to real wages. Also the a priori expectation (based on
the previous section) is that the labour market (i.e. W®t) does not determine actual real
wages (Wt).
Inspection of Qt in equations IIU and IID supports our a priori expectations.
Clearly Qt is not only highly significant but also exhibits the correct a priori signs. W®t is
also insignificant. Real wages (Wt) do not exhibit the signs dictated by traditional
economics. Indeed, they are the opposite of what orthodox economics predicts. They
are consistent, however, with the pro-cyclical nature of real wages. This in turn is also
consistent with the Patinkin (1956, 1965) analysis, where a positive relationship
between employment and real wages is possible: if the economy is depressed, then upon
stimulation the real wage will move directly with economic activity, with a rise in both
output and employment (see Section 2.3).
Due to dis-hoarding in Period II, and since real wages are positively correlated
with Qt, Nt will vary more closely with Qt- Moreover, the pro-cyclical nature of real
wages is further reinforced by the signs on Pt (positive) and Ut (negative) in equation
n w (refer to section 3.1.2).6 Consequendy, a positive coefficient on the real wage in the
labour demand function, and a negative coefficient on the real wage in the unemployment
equation, are consistent with the theory presented. The statistical insignificance of the

Section 3.1 is relevant for assessing the model.

real wage in the unemployment function (IIU) maybe accounted for by a greater variation
in Ut, due to volatilily in factors such as the participation rate and output.
Both the variables Pt and AWt are statistically significant (AWt also exhibits the a
priori sign), strongly suggesting that an arbitration/union nexus, at the expense of labour
market forces as implied by W®t being insignificant, predominantly explains the level of
actual real wages (Wt) as discussed in section 3.1.2. An insignificant coefficient on Ut in
n W implies that union activity in terms of Wt may be active and independent of Ut. This
is further borne out by the fact that W®t is insignificant, which is consistent with the
coefficient a2 (= -0.04) for Period II as discussed in the previous section. Moreover, the
positive sign on W®t is consistent with the eigenvalues of 0.427 and 0.067, but the fact
that W®t is insignificant and thus explains little variation in Wt, implies that the behaviour
of the model, although stable, is perhaps approaching constant oscillations as depicted by
diagram 4.1(b). That is, the less the market responds to the difference in supply and
demand, the less equilibrium values (W^t) have to do with explaining variations in actual
values (Wt).
At this stage is is worth noting that, on the surface, Nt is a major source of
adjustment. This indicates a (New)Keynesian scenario, which also was implied in the
previous section. This is further reinforced by the negative sign on the statistically
significant variable, Ut, in the labour supply equations. Ham (1986) argues that this
indicates involuntary unemployment (refer to Section 3.1.4).
Further investigation of the model, however, indicates the presence of Neoclassical unemployment. The positive sign on variable Bt in the wage equation suggests
that a reservation wage mechanism may be present (refer to section 3.1.2). This,
coupled with the negative coefficient on St in equation (IIU), suggests a rise in voluntary
or search unemployment.

Its magnitude, however, suggests that Neo-Classical

unemployment is of little importance. The construction of the variable (St = Bt/Wt),
however, may be inadequate as Bt only captures unemployment benefits for single adult
males (without dependants). Bt does not capture all the monetary and non-monetary

RESUI^TS
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Period I
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benefits of being unemployed such as medical, transport and housing concessions which
are especially important for families, nor the pleasure derived from not working, or a
reduction in the work ethic. Essentially, Neo-Classical aspects are present in the model,
since social and economic institutions (as indicated by the prominence of AWt and Pt at
the expense of W®t) appear to have generated a real wage overhang. The estimate of W®t,
(equal to $230.43 on average), is below Wt ($262.78), which is a real wage overhang.
The model is performing well, as it has generated a real wage overhang which is
characteristic of Period II (Indecs, 1986). In the model, however, the real wage
overhang can be explained equally well by a decline in Qt or an arbitration/union nexus.
For example, as briefly explained in Section 3.1.2, award wage decisions, probably
resulting from union pressure, may maintain real wages above the market clearing level.
This scenario, as pictured here, is consistent with Patinkin's (1956, 1965) analysis and is
described by Barro and Grossman (1971) as Neo-Classical Involuntary unemployment.
Stimulating output will not reduce unemployment unless the real wage is reduced, but a
reduction in real wages may not in itself be sufficient to expand output and hence
employment (i.e. decrease unemployment). This is consistent with the analysis in
Section 2.3, which supports the proposition that, as Wt approaches W^t, unemployment
may remain unchanged or only decline slighdy, i.e. non-clearing market equilibrium.
According to Trivedi and Baker (1982), evidence suggests the emergence of NeoClassical unemployment. However, they found, by further manipulation of their model,
that after 1972, firms were constrained by orders for their goods. It appears, therefore,
that firms are quantity-constrained, which implies demand-deficiency. Clearly this can be
described as Neo-Classical involuntary unemployment. It appears, therefore, that both
real wages and quantity constraints, both of which are demand factors, explain variations
in Ut for Period II.
This last proposition is supported by the fact that both the non-demand factors (St
and Tt in equation IIU) are insignificant. The sign on the Stoikov Index (Tt) supports the
hypothesis that structural unemployment explains littie variation of a rising Ut in Period
II. Trivedi and Baker (1985) also found that the Stoikov index was not important in

explaining Ut. Supporting this is Mitchell's (1983) survey of the Australian labour
market, which found no evidence that change in the composition of the labour force or
social changes are the root of the level of increased unemployment since the early 1970s
(King, 1986, pl02). King (1986, pl02) however, states that while Mitchell did not
provide a detailed refutation, "Mitchell was correct with respect to the current
unemployment, which is overwhelmingly demand-deficient in nature, and [...] past
experience suggests little reason to fear a substantial rise in structural unemployment in
any future vigorous upswing".
An unexpected result, however, is the variable Kt in equation ED. It is significant
and yielded a negative sign. While it was expected to be significant, the sign runs
counter to the above conclusions and the body of theory presented in section 3.1.3.

If

output (Qt) is pressing against productive capacity, it is reasonable to assume that firms
may expand their capital stock (Kt). The implication of a negative sign on Kt in the
employment function is:
(i)

that the displacement of labour would contribute to structural unemployment,
therefore Tt in the unemployment equation should be significant and positive; and

(ii)

labour productivity should increase because the capital-labour ratio would be
rising. Increasing capital stock relative to the quantity of labour employed,
assuming that output either increases or remains constant, should increase output
per worker.

The variable used to capture structural unemployment (Tt) in Period 11, however, is
statistically insignificant and yields a negative sign. The two variables enter the model
with the same sign and are therefore inconsistent. Moreover, as indicated by Indecs
(1986), Australia has wimessed declining growth rates of average productivity of labour
during Period H. These conflicts need explanation, which is attempted below.
One explanation is that the conflicting signs on Kt and Tt may have arisen because
the structural unemployment variable (Tt) is inadequate in capuiring shifts in labour skills
demanded and supplied. Perhaps other measures of structural unemployment should be
tried. Alternatively, evidence of a real wage overhang in Period n is consistent with a

negative Kt, in equation IID. That is, firms which are output-constrained, but face
excessive real wages may, in the long run, be induced to increase their capital stock in an
attempt to reduce production costs. A rising capital-labour ratio, if associated with
sluggish growth in Qt, may reflect declining growth in labour productivity.
Furthermore, if we accept that the variable Kt is capturing labour substitution, the
conflict between the signs on Kt and Tt may be resolved when one acknowledges that,
because output is deficient in Period U, it has not offset the rise in unemployment due to
labour displacement. If the displaced labour remains unemployed because of poor
growth in output, we may still conclude that unemployment is the result of insufficient
output. The substitution effect of labour for capital is greater than the output effect.
It is difficult, however, faced with a negative coefficient on Kt to accept that the
displaced labour does not show up as being structurally unemployed, although, if they
reject jobs that do not require their skills, then the displaced workers may be viewed as
becoming involuntary unemployed. The model indicates that Qt is significant in
explaining both employment and unemployment in a period that experienced rising
unemployment (graph 1.1, section 1.1.1). Adopting Kt which displaces labour when
output (Qt) is constrained, is consistent with labour dis-hoarding. In contrast, if output is
expanding when firms are adopting labour-saving capital, then labour productivity should
I I

rise without contributing to unemployment. Levacic and Rebmann (1988, p70), make
the point that "the acquisition of labour-saving capital equipment will reduce firms'
demand for specific types of labour and for labour in general unless demand growth
keeps pace with the increase in labour productivity."
Assuming, however, that output is not constrained, the real wage overhang (and
labour dis-hoarding) still flies in the face of declining growth rates of average
productivity of labour during Period n (Index, 1986); too high a real wage will lead to
increased Kt and retrenchment of the least efficient labour, which raises productivity.
However:

i)

productivity is difficult to measure; in particular, averages may hide rapid
productivity growth in many industries (of different sizes). An unweighted
average smooths out differences across industries;
ii) there may be disguised productivity increases. The nature of some changing
capital is not as readily measurable as physical output, and
iii) in practice firms retrench labour based on other principles, such as marital status
or the "last-on-ñrst-off' principle.
At this stage we are unable fully to explain these results. The assumption of
unconstrained output, however, does not appear to be plausible for Period n. Rather,
evidence of firms facing output constraints, in Period H, has been presented earlier in this
section and section 2.3.1.
Finally, W®t in nS confirms the established behaviour of the participation rate. It
would appear that the behaviour of the participation rate in the mid 1970s, as described
by Gregory and Duncan ((1979 (in Gregory, 1984)) was atypical. The negative sign on
Lt in Period II is unusual and up to now remains unexplained. In Period I, however, Lt
in equation IS indicates appropriately the positive relationship between Lt and N®t.
Moreover, W®t in IS exhibits the same leisure-income trade-offs as in Period II. We now
turn to Period I in more detail.
?^rÍQ(í I
As in Period n there is no evidence of structural unemployment. Variables Kt and
Tt enter the model with opposite signs suggesting little labour substitution. The
coefficient on Kt is positive which is consistent with the proposition that capital is labouraugmenting. The coefficient on the variable Tt is insignificant and negative, which
indicates that structural unemployment does not explain Ut in Period I. The variable St is
highly significant and the positive sign indicates a high degree of voluntary
unemployment (Section 3.1.1). This is reinforced by the significant positive sign on Ut
in equation IS, which again indicates voluntary unemployment (Ham 1986). If
unemployment in Period I is primarily voluntary, one would expect actual wages (Wt) to

be either below or equal to equilibrium wages (W®t)- Indeed, on average, actual wages
(= $194.95) were estimated by the model to be just below equilibrium wages ($202.86).
In essence, if unemployment in Period I is voluntary then wages should be the primary
source of adjustment in the labour market. This is borne out by the correct signs on the
statistically significant wage variables in the relevant structural equations and the analysis
in the previous section, where the value of a2 in Period I suggests instantaneous
adjustment.
A theoretical scenario which explains the real wage underhang (i.e. actual wages
suppressed below equilibrium wages) is Keynes' theory of inflation (cited in Trevithick
and Mulvey (1976)). The theory is also satisfying in two other respects as it allows for:
i)

inflation that is contained; and

ii)

arisingreal wage over time, even though it is suppressed below equilibrium.

These two characteristics are also consistent with the experience of the 1960s in Period I.
The Neo-Keynesian one-sector output model, which underlies the IS-curve in the
IS-LM framework, implies convergence of inflation. Keynes, however, in his article
'How to Pay for the War* (cited by Trevithick and Mulvey (1976)), raises the possibility
that inflation may be persistent. The distribution of income between workers and
business (owners of capital) plays a crucial role. Keynes assumed a wage-price
mechanism (which is akin to a wage-price spiral) where prices react instantaneously to
wages, while money wages respond fully, with a lag to price rises by a constant factor
(say X). This is summarised in the following two equations:
Pt = (1 + X) Wt

(i)

Wt = Pt-i
Prices and wages will continue to rise at the proportional rate of X in all periods except
the first. Inflation will occur at a constant rate. If either labour or businesses try to gain
greater amounts than X, then inflation will accelerate, which appears to have occurred in
Period II as evidenced by a significant positive Pt in equation IIW. In Period I, the
variable Pt is insignificant, and thus does not explain variations in Wt. The difference in
the significance of Pt across periods suggests a lagged response to money wages that

have at least instantly adjusted or even over-adjusted to a rise in current prices.
Consequently, the variable Pt in Period I is consistent with Keynes' theory of inflation.
In Period II there appears to be no lag between money wages and Pt; the evidence of a
real wage overhang for this period is consistent with greater claims on X . To test the
credibility of the lagged scenario it was decided to lag prices in the wage equation for
Period I. The results are presented below;'^
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Clearly Pt becomes highly significant when lagged six periods. This adds
credibility to the lagged scenario presented by Keynes (as set out by Trevithick and
Mulvey (1976)). Equation IIW indicates that a lag does not operate in Period 11. To
confirm this, prices were lagged up to six periods; predictably the coefficient was not
significant.
Note that Bt in IWa was omitted because the negative sign on Bt in (IW) indicates
that causation between Wt and Bt does not flow in the direction that is implied by
specifying Bt on the right hand side of the equation (see section 3.1.2). The
unemployment variable is insignificant in both equations (IW, IW(a)), as was the case in
IIW. The variable was equally insignificant in both equations, but W^t became
insignificant in IW(a). This is not too disappointing, as it was argued that arbitration in
Period I may have imposed a lag in labour market adjustment.
The equation warranted correction for auto-correlation, using the Cochrane-Orcutt (CO)
technique. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and the respective levels of statistical
significance are presented below each respective variable. The standard error of regression is
satisfactorily low.

In summary, equation IW(a) supports the suggestion of a lagged response of
money wages to current prices. Perhaps in Period I, unlike Period H, unions were preoccupied with working conditions and prices were considered less significant. Perhaps
workers suffered from money illusion, but according to Neo-Keynesians this assumption
would cause inflation to decline. Inflation was persistent and fairly constant, which is
what Keynes' scenario predicts. The scenario explains the real wage underhang which
also allows for real wages to rise over time.
How would one describe or characterize the economy during Period I? The
adjustment equation suggests that the economy conforms to Neo-Classical theory, since
real wages are the major source of adjustment. Indeed, real wages are more significant in
the unemployment equation (lU) in explaining unemployment than is output. The
relationship, unlike that in Period II, exhibits the traditional (Neo-Classical) relationship
between Ut and Wt. The inverse relationship between employment and real wages is
confirmed by the coefficient on W®t in equation ID. The economy during Period I
conforms to Neo-Classical theory, in that real wages changes were sufficient to stimulate
sufficient output to provide full employment.
A disequilibrium regime, not expected to occur until this point, but which is found
in the literature of disequilibrium, is 'Repressed Inflation'. This regime is characterised
not only by a real wage underhang (excess demand for labour in the labour market), but
also by excess demand in the product market: both goods and labour market are
characteerised by excess demand. Clearly, this describes Period I. There is evidence of
a real wage underhang; sufficient or high output levels (excess product demand), and
hence at least full employment and finally, constant but contained inflation rates (i.e.
repressed due to a real wage underhang). Product market equations would need to be
added to the existing model to determine this. This thesis, however, tentatively
concludes that Period I can be best described as a 'Repressed Inflation' regime.
Excess demand in the product market certainly explains why output is highly
significant (although less significant than real wages) in equation lU.
A (New)Keynesian, however, would question why there is excess demand for output

when real wages are low, since real wages constitute a significant proportion of aggregate
(effective) product demand. In Period I the high levels of output may be explained by
reference to fiscal policy.
Probably, fiscal policy was more effective in Period I than in Period H, because
of the following factors:
i)

A real wage underhang. In Period II it was demonstrated that a real wage
overhang thwarted economic expansion, and labour costs rose.

ii)

Smaller leakages in Period I. Perhaps in Period II the marginal propensities to
import, save and tax have risen. For example, bracket creep (due to inflation) has
pushed incomes into higher marginal tax brackets. Consequently, the income
multiplier with respect to net government spending on goods and services is
smaller.

iii)

Related to (ii), given that fiscal policy is less expansionary in Period II, then
shortfalls in government revenues have had to be made up by government
borrowing (i.e. selling bonds to the public), thus placing pressure on the financial
market to raise interest rates. The higher interest rates have dampening effects on
the economy which further lower the income multipliers. Borrowing from the
Reserve Bank may validate the inflationary process by increasing the growth rate
of the money supply.

iv)

Unlike Period I, budgets in Period II had a greater proportion of spending on
transfer payments relative to government spending on goods and services. A
possible indirect effect is to reduce the economy's capacity to generate taxation
revenue because the budget is less effective in stimulating national income. This
in turn has implications for public sector borrowing requirements to the extent that
an expanding budget deficit does not generate increases in taxation revenue. If
growth in national income is slow, number (iii) above, will be exacerbated.

To the extent that excess aggregate product demand in Period I is the result of
effective fiscal management, and Keynes' theory of inflation is consistent with the

disequilibrium regime of 'repressed inflation', then clearly this regime also has elements
of Keynesianism.

The 'repressed inflation' regime, as in Period I, is a mix of

(New)Keynesian and Neo-Classical scenarios. It is Neo-Classical to the extent that the
real wage underhang facilitates full or over-full employment. The adjustment equations
indicate that real wages were the major source of adjustment, and equations ID and lU
show an inverse relationship between real wages and employment.
A difficult result to explain, however, is the significant but negative relationship
between Qt and employment in the labour demand function (ED). It is inconsistent with
the apparently correct sign on Qt in equation lU and it is difficult to decide which is
correct.

The negative relationship between Qt and Ut implies, a priori, a positive

relationship between employment and output.

If Period I is characterized by significant

degrees of labour hoarding it is conceivable that over the business cycle a negative
relationship between employment and output may result. Perhaps a negative Qt in ID is
not, as first thought, odd. Moreover, the coefficient on Qt in lU is only just significant at
the 5% level of confidence; the coefficient on Qt (in lU) is not far from being positive,
but the inconsistent signs on Qt in equations lU and ID are difficult to fathom.

4.4

SUMMARY;

AN0VERVI15W

Disequilibrium economics is relatively new and the literature is in its infancy.
Consequentiy, the interpretation of regression results is difficult. Results that at first
glance appear to be unsatisfactory in fact suggest scenarios that were not obvious. For
example:
i)

the interpretation of Ut in the respective labour supply equations (IS and IIS)
allows us to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary employment;

ii)

a positive relationship between real wages and the demand for labour (i.e. a
negative relationship between Ut and W®t) in Period II proved to be consistent
with Patinkin's (1956,1965) disequilibrium analysis;

iii)

a negative sign on Kt in the demand for labour function (IID) in Period II, it was
argued, may not be inconsistent with a negative Tt in the unemployment equation
nU; and finally
iv) an awkward negative sign on Qt in the demand for labour function in Period I,
may well be consistent with labour hoarding in that period.
Generally, speaking, however, the variables were internally consistent, which adds
credence to the model.
TABLE 4.2
Summary of Conclusions
Period I
- voluntary unemployment
- real wage underhang
- real wages major source of
adjustment
- no capital substitution
- determination of real wages
influenced by market conditions
- employment unresponsive to
output variations
- repressed inflation
- demand factors more significant
than non-demand factors
- structural unemployment
insignificant

Period n
- involuntary unemployment
- real wage overhang
- employment major source of
adjustment
- capital substitution; labour displacement
- real wages not detennined by
labour market forces;
essentially determined
institutionally
- employment more responsive
to variations in output than in
Period I
- Neo-Classical involuntary
unemployment
- demand factors more significant
than non-demand factors; although
capital substitution involved in
unemployment nexus over the long run
- structural unemployment
insignificant

Another interesting result of the model is that the results across the two periods
are almost mirror images. The table below summarizes the conclusion drawn for both
periods and except for the last two conclusions they are mirror images. I found no
evidence of rising structural unemployment in either of the periods, and search
unemployment was found to be unimportant in Period H. In both periods demand factors
appeared to be the major explanation of unemployment; where Period I is characterized
by 'Repressed Inflation', Period II was described as 'Neo-Classical Involuntary
Unemployment'. Neither period was characterized by either pure (New)Keynesian or
pure Neo-Classical regimes. As implied by the terms 'Neo-Classical Involuntary' and
'Repressed Inflation', each period was a hybrid of (New)Keynesian and Neo-Classical
scenarios. Both these descriptions are consistent with the conclusions that demand
factors (i.e. a wage-output (demand) nexus) primarily explain unemployment, but are
opposite in that underlying 'Repressed Inflation' is a real wage underhang while a real
wage overhang underlies 'Neo-Classical Involuntary' unemployment.

4.5

POLTCY

IMPLICATIONS

Classifying Period II as Neo-Classical Involuntary implies that the economy in this
period is suffering from a real wage overhang and insufficient output. The removal of
the overhang, however, would be not sufficient to stimulate output. This conclusion is
derived only from a disequilibrium framework, where the equality of the actual with the
equilibrium real wage is possible, but unemployment may still exist because of
insufficient output (Patinkin 1956, 1965); i.e. non-clearing market equilibrium. On the
other hand an expansion in output will not lead to a sustained decline in unemployment
because of the real wage overhang. The real wage overhang will persist during an
expansion in output, because the model predicts that real wages move pro-cyclically.
With this in mind, a prerequisite to a sustained decline in unemployment is a reduction
in real wages. To this end the current policy of the Accord is appropriate. Generally the
policy of wage restraint advocated by the current Labor government is a step in the right
direction.

Output, however, needs to be stimulated in order to reduce unemployment,
because a decline in real wages is not a sufficient condition to reduce unemployment. At
the time of writing this thesis, it is acknowledged that Australia is facing an international
constraint. Allowing the exchange rate to float and consequently depreciate, however,
achieves simultaneously a stimulus to output and a reduction in real wages, assuming that
the accord is successful in containing money wages. Assuming that the trade deficit is
not too large in the near future, and real wages are again not too excessive, then the
government

can

supplement

output

expansion

by providing monetary/fiscal

expansion. Under these conditions government borrowing should not place excessive
pressure on interest rates, as taxation revenue should rise without any necessary increase
in the marginal tax rate. When real wages are too high, any monetary/fiscal expansion
will thwart a sustained rise in national income and employment, and hence in taxation
revenues. Importantly, however, a reduction in the real wage is not sufficient to reduce
involuntary unemployment, but appears to be a necessary prerequisite.
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